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The Importance of Purpose in Probation 
Decision Making 
Wayne A. Logan† 
Now and again we should take time out to speculate on the 
essence of the thing called probation.  What is the purpose 
of our efforts, the sine qua non of our service?1 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose can and should play a central role in any 
governmental endeavor, including most certainly the 
disposition of convicted criminal offenders.  Each year tens 
of millions of dollars are expended by the U.S. correctional 
system apparatus, and millions of lives are seriously affected 
by the decisions made by justice system actors.  Given these 
fiscal and human costs, it would stand to reason that clarity 
of purpose would weigh heavily in correctional strategies, 
determining both the allocation and varieties of sanctions 
imposed on offenders.  However, as the undifferentiated 
expansion of U.S. corrections over the past twenty years 
vividly attests, the justice system has been anything but 
careful in its assessment and application of purpose. 
This symposium on the Model Penal Code’s sentencing 
provisions provides an ideal opportunity to take stock of the 
importance of purpose in the sentencing process.  Published 
in 1962, yet based on work conducted during much of the 
1950s, the tenor and substance of the Code’s sentencing 
provisions plainly bespeak the penological and legal views of 
 
 †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  I thank Professors 
Richard Frase, Marc Miller, Michael Smith, and Ron Wright for helpful comments 
and suggestions on prior drafts; the William Mitchell College of Law Faculty 
Research Fund for financial support; Meg Daniel for editorial expertise, and 
Sarah Boswell-Healey for research assistance. 
 1. Charles L. Chute, Ye News Letter, Apr. 1932 (weekly publication of the 
National Probation and Parole Association) (reprinted in 61 Fed. Probation 58 
(1997)). 
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their time of origin, an era when indeterminate sentencing 
and the optimistic promise of rehabilitation held central 
sway.  The widespread abolition of parole, the advent of 
mandatory sentencing, and other similarly harsh measures 
underscore the changed circumstances marking the current 
criminal justice landscape—one that is far less 
discretionary, individualized, and optimistic about the 
prospects for rendering offenders law-abiding. 
Probation, however, represents a singular exception to 
this massive shift.  Just as in 1962, probation today mainly 
remains a discretionary enterprise, predicated on the 
individualized assessment of offenders, and dedicated to 
the use of community-based resources to assist in their 
reform.  It continues to seek, as the Supreme Court stated 
seventy years ago, the “comprehensive consideration [of] 
the particular situation of each offender. . . .”2  This 
constancy, however, should not belie the significant 
changes occurring in probation.3  No longer is probation 
synonymous with the “soft” enterprise of rehabilitating 
offenders.  Rather, in tandem with the expanded array of 
techniques coming into use over time, which by design and 
effect have considerably more onerous effects, probation 
today is animated by a far richer gamut of purposes—
including the punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of 
offenders, and the restoration of victims and communities 
to their pre-crime status. 
Despite these massive changes, the articulated 
purposes of probation have not kept pace, creating a 
rudderless system that fails to provide meaningful 
 
 2. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932). 
 3. “Probation,” as used here throughout, refers to the broad gamut of 
sanctions short of “total” or “active” imprisonment.  The term has always been 
variously defined and with changes in the field this definitional uncertainty has 
grown, with phrases such as “community corrections,” “compliance programs,” 
“noncustodial sanctions,” and the like coming into active use.  Nonetheless, the 
historic term is employed here for ease of reference and fealty to the Code’s 
terminology, as well as its continued common usage in statutes and case law.  
Also, the discussion here focuses on probationary decisions regarding individual 
offenders, not organizations, although its essence can be taken to apply in that 
context as well. 
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guidance on instances when probation is warranted and, 
when applied, the terms and conditions appropriate for 
given offenders.4  This deficit, of course, also besets decision 
making with respect to prison-bound offenders.5  Probation 
decisions, however, present a more pressing need for 
articulated purpose, for at least three reasons. 
First, with prison the essential question is “how much 
time?,”6 which today is largely driven by retributive and 
incapacitative concerns.  With probation, and its broad 
gamut of non-incarcerative sanctions, by contrast, the 
decision maker is faced with a far richer and more nuanced 
gamut of purposes.  Second, unlike the basic philosophical 
question of warranted prison time, historically probation 
has been considerably more pragmatic.  This pragmatism 
has allowed probation to endure and even flourish amid the 
radical shift toward punitiveness over the past several 
decades.  This very resilience, however, is jeopardized by 
the failure to speak with specificity to the intended 
purposes of particular probation decisions.  Finally, the 
sheer practical realities that probation today accounts for 
the majority of criminal justice dispositions, and that fiscal 
concerns will likely lead to its ever greater use,7 create a 
corresponding need to craft a rational, purpose-based 
framework to inform probation decisions. 
 
 4. See 1 Neil P. Cohen, The Law of Probation and Parole § 7:1, at 7-4 (2d ed. 
1999) (noting that despite their widespread use “surprisingly little judicial or 
legislative attention has been devoted to analyzing the purposes of probation . . . 
conditions”). 
 5. Professor Marc Miller has been one of the most persistent advocates of 
this view, with particular respect to the creation and implementation of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Taking “Purposes” 
Seriously: The Neglected Requirement of Guideline Sentencing, 3 Fed. Sent. Rep. 
295 (1991); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1992).  As 
Professor Miller observes, “[s]entencing in most systems seems unconnected to 
the traditional purposes of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation.”  Id. at 414. 
 6. See Michael E. Smith, Designing and Implementing Noncustodial Penal 
Sanctions: What Purposes Will Real Alternatives Serve?, 4 Fed. Sent. Rep. 27 
(1991) (noting same). 
 7. See generally Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget 
Crisis Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 Fed. 
Sent. Rep. 41 (2002). 
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This article addresses the role of purpose in probation 
decision making, in two contexts.  The first concerns the 
threshold determination of whether prison or probation is 
warranted, characterized by the Code’s Commentary as a 
“stark choice,” but one nonetheless capable of being guided 
by criteria.8  The second concerns the decision over what 
probation conditions are warranted for particular 
offenders, a domain where “it is much more difficult to 
state some useful legislative criteria,” which the Code 
therefore declined to address.9 
The article begins with an overview of the historical 
origins of probation and an analysis of the Code’s several 
probation-related sections.  Part II surveys the many 
changes occurring in probation over the past forty years, 
including the many innovations in techniques employed, 
with their varied goals and purposes.  As will be apparent, 
concerns over the generality of the substantive law 
governing probation, evident at the time of the Code, have 
only been accentuated by the major changes occurring in 
probation over the past forty years.  In part III, the article 
addresses the importance of purpose in decisions to grant 
probation and to impose probation conditions, and examines 
some possible ways that purpose might be incorporated in 
the current reevaluation of the Code’s probation provisions. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROBATION AND THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE’S PROBATION PROVISIONS 
A. History 
The U.S. probation system is the progeny of John 
Augustus, a Boston cobbler, who in 1841 altruistically took 
it upon himself to intervene on behalf of “common 
drunkards” and petty criminals, rescuing them from 
 
 8. Model Penal Code § 7.01 cmt. at 223 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
 9. Id. at 223-24.  The Commentary hastens to add, however, that “the Code’s 
premises would favor any further development that can usefully be made along 
this line.”  Id. at 224. 
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squalid houses of correction.10  To Augustus, the object of 
the law was “to reform criminals, and to prevent crime and 
not to punish maliciously, or from a spirit of revenge.”11  
During his eighteen years of work he intervened on behalf 
of over two thousand offenders; of the initial 1100, only one 
forfeited bond.12  In the ensuing years, probation caught on 
in popularity, with Massachusetts enacting the nation’s 
first probation statute in 1878 (for juveniles),13 and New 
York enacting the nation’s first probation for adults in 
1901.14  Soon thereafter adult probation laws appeared in 
Missouri, Vermont, Illinois, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and 
New Jersey.15  In the absence of express statutory 
authority, the movement was hobbled by uncertainty over 
the common law authority of courts to suspend the 
execution or imposition of sentences.16  The question was 
answered definitively in Ex Parte United States (Killits),17 
when a unanimous Supreme Court held that federal courts 
(and by inference state courts) lacked inherent authority to 
suspend sentences for indefinite periods.18 
The Court’s decision prompted jurisdictions 
nationwide to enact laws conferring express authority on 
courts to suspend jail or prison terms and impose 
 
 10. See generally David Dressler, Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole 
11-18 (1959).  Although Augustus is credited with the first use of the term 
probation and the spread of probation in the U.S., similar efforts were being 
undertaken in England at that time and shortly before.  Id. at 11-12. 
 11. Id. at 17 (citing John Augustus, First Probation Officer 23 (1939)). 
 12. Id. at 18. 
 13. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, in 22 Crime & Just. 149, 
156 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Dressler, supra note 10, at 20. 
 16. Id. at 21.  Chief Justice Marshall, while on circuit duty in 1808, upheld an 
“extralegal” term of probation, in keeping with the prevailing judicial assumption 
that courts enjoyed common law authority to suspend sentences.  See J.M. 
Master, Legislative Background of the Federal Probation Act, 14 Fed. Probation 
9, 10 (1950). 
 17. 242 U.S. 27 (1916). 
 18. According to the Court, while “common law courts possessed the power by 
recognizances to secure good behavior, that is to enforce the law,” this did not 
compel acceptance of “the proposition that those courts possessed the arbitrary 
discretion to permanently decline to enforce the law.”  Id. at 29. 
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probationary conditions.19  What began as an altruistic 
endeavor, spearheaded by a few hearty souls often harshly 
criticized for what was seen as their indulgence,20 came to 
play a central part in Progressive Era efforts to humanize, 
and individualize, criminal justice.21  As noted by David 
Rothman: 
The Progressives were anti-institutional, not in that they 
intended to break down buildings and walls or even to 
return the majority of deviants to the community, but 
rather in that, by implementing open-ended, informal, and 
highly flexible policies, they were devising an individual, 
case-by-case strategy for rehabilitation.22 
The increasing popularity of probation, and other 
Progressive reforms such as the juvenile justice system, 
parole, and indeterminate sentencing, owed much to the 
emerging influence of social science.  Armed with advances 
 
 19. At the time of the Court’s decision, at least sixty federal districts in thirty-
nine states were suspending sentences, in the absence of statutory authority.  
Victor H. Evjen, The Federal Probation System: The Struggle to Achieve It and 
It’s [sic] First 25 Years, 61 Fed. Probation 81 (1997).  By 1933, all but two states 
allowed probation for juveniles, and thirty-four states, plus the District of 
Columbia and federal government, authorized probation for adults.  Probation 
and Criminal Justice 228 (Charles L. Chute & Sheldon Glueck eds., 1933). 
 20. The statement in 1916 of one federal judge directed to Charles Lionel 
Chute, head of the National Probation Association, captured views of many 
critics: 
I most sincerely hope that you will fail in your efforts . . . .  In England, and 
in Canada a man is either at liberty after a trial and acquittal, or with a 
discolored ring around his neck dead within thirty days after he has sent 
some one into eternity . . . .  In this country, due to people like yourselves, 
the murderer has a cell bedecked with flowers and is surrounded by a lot of 
silly people. 
Charles Lionel Chute & Marjorie Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation 106 (1956).  
The U.S. Attorney General opposed enactment of the federal probation law in 
1925, referring to probation as “part of a wave of maudlin rot of misplaced 
sympathy for criminals that is going over the country.”  Ronald L. Goldfarb & 
Linda R. Singer, After Conviction 215 (1973). 
 21. For a concise overview of the early intellectual origins of probation see 
Edward W. Sieh, From Augustus to the Progressives: A Study of Probation’s 
Formative Years, 57 Fed. Probation 67 (1993). 
 22. David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its 
Alternatives in Progressive America 43 (1980). 
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in psychology, criminological theory, and statistics, 
corrections policy came to focus less on the offense and 
more on the offender, borrowing from the diagnostic tenets 
of medicine.23  As noted by one leading Progressive 
reformer: “‘Our new attitude . . . toward the criminal is not 
one of forming moral judgments against him, but it is 
intelligently finding out what the trouble is and putting 
into operation those influences and agencies . . . that will 
restore him to society.’”24  In 1933, Thorsten Sellin 
characterized the “struggle for the individualization of 
penal treatment on the basis of the character of the 
criminal instead of the character of his offense [as] one of 
the most dramatic in the history of thought.”25 
This case-by-case approach to criminal justice required 
flexibility and discretionary authority; the courts used the 
expansive statutory authority granted them to channel 
offenders into one of two categories: “‘those who will and 
who will not reform without punishment.’”26  Likely 
candidates for prison included both those who were thought 
simply too dangerous to be at-large and those who should 
be imprisoned “for their own good” inasmuch as prison held 
the rehabilitative promise of discipline and training.27  
Good candidates for probation were those criminal 
offenders who evinced a strong likelihood of repair and low 
risk of recidivism.28 
 
 23. Id. at 56-57. 
 24. Id. at 57 (citation omitted). 
 25. Thorsten Sellin, The Granting of Probation: The Trial Judge’s Dilemma: A 
Criminologist’s View, in Probation and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of 
Herbert C. Parsons 99, 101 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1933).  See also John H. 
Wigmore et al., General Introduction to the Modern Criminal Science Series, in 
Raymond Saleilles, The Individualization of Punishment v, vii (Rachel Szold 
Jastrow trans., 1911) (“modern science recognizes that penal or remedial 
treatment cannot possibly be indiscriminate and machine-like, but must be 
adapted to the causes, and to the man as affected by those causes.  Thus the great 
truth of the present and the future, for criminal science, is the individualization of 
penal treatment. . . .”). 
 26. Rothman, supra note 22, at 63. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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For their part, judges relished the unfettered 
discretionary authority afforded by probation statutes.  
Under prevailing legal doctrine, their decisions regarding 
which offenders warranted probation and the conditions 
deemed appropriate were virtually unfettered.29  
Prosecutors, as well, embraced probation, which Sheldon 
Glueck called the “flower” among the weeds of the “barren 
soil of penology.”30  For them, probation constituted a 
valuable plea negotiation tool that allowed expeditious 
processing of unprecedented volumes of offenders 
inundating urban courts during the first quarter of the 
century.31 
The data underscore the increasing popularity of 
probation.  In a statistical pattern that continues to this 
day,32 during the first decades of the 1900s the number of 
probationers came to surpass that of prisoners.33  This 
predisposition in favor of probation was reflected in opinions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court during the first half of the 
century that increasingly noted the necessity of 
 
 29. Id. at 75.  See also Sellin, supra note 25, at 100, 102.  Cf. Sam Bass 
Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Judges and Law Reform 159 (1936) (noting that “the 
law gives the judge wide discretion in sentencing, but furnishes him no assistance 
in exercising that discretion”). 
Professor Rothman notes that courts especially embraced broad 
discretionary authority because it assisted in the processing of the increasingly 
heterogeneous mass of offenders coming before them in the early twentieth 
century.  As he notes, “[i]t may not be coincidental that sentencing practices 
became most flexible just when immigration reached unprecedented proportions.  
Now judges could distinguish among criminals not in terms of what they had 
done but in terms of who they were—and they may have found this leeway 
necessary in dealing with a bewildering variety of aliens.”  Rothman, supra note 
22, at 77.  See also id. at 103 (“[u]nder these circumstances, judges may well have 
been particularly enthusiastic about a procedure that allowed them ample room 
for distinctions among offenders, not on the basis of the crime, but on the basis of 
the person.”).  Rothman surveys probation eligibility criteria identified by judges 
of the time and concludes that socio-economic and cultural discrimination was at 
work.  Id. at 104-06. 
 30. Sheldon Glueck, The Significance and Promise of Probation, in Probation 
and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of Herbert C. Parsons, supra note 25, at 3. 
 31. Rothman, supra note 22,  at 78. 
 32. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Max Grunhut, Penal Reform: A Comparative Study 297 (1948) (citing 
data from New York and California). 
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individualized discretionary justice,34 culminating with its 
acknowledgment in Williams v. New York that “[r]etribution 
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.  
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become 
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”35  By 1956, when 
Mississippi became the last of the continental states to enact 
a probation statute,36 individualized discretionary justice 
had become a defining feature of U.S. corrections. 
Probation philosophy reflected the individualized and 
curative tenets of the field’s origin.  Probation officers were 
initially regarded as instructive “friends” of the probationer 
and starting in the 1920s as “social workers.”37  The 
“relationship” between probationers and probation officers 
served as the defining element in the enterprise, with 
structured “visits and interviews” serving as the primary 
means of intervention.38  One influential text of the era 
urged 
social-psychological treatment, to be achieved largely 
through interviewing and counseling.  In some situations 
the officer may employ suggestion, persuasion, and the 
presentation of alternative courses.  The offender needs 
clarification of his conduct and of his weaknesses and 
strengths and some measure of directive guidance in 
meeting the problems that are crucial in his striving to 
become a law-abiding individual. . . .  Conceivably there is 
some merit in the prevalent idea that the office should 
 
 34. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932). 
 35. 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 251 (1952) (noting “ a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and 
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public 
prosecution”). 
 36. Andrew R. Klein, Alternative Sentencing, Intermediate Sanctions and 
Probation 68 (2d. ed. 1996). 
 37. Rothman, supra note 22, at 64-67.  Illustrative of this view was the 
exhortation to probation officers heard at a 1928 meeting of the National 
Probation Association: “If there is any probation officer here . . . who does not 
consider himself or herself to be a social worker, . . . you are either going to 
change your mind and develop a social work consciousness, or you are a member 
of a passing race.”  Phillip A. Parsons, The Selection and Training of Probation 
Officers, 1928 Proceedings of the National Probation Association 37, 38. 
 38. Paul W. Tappan, Crime, Justice and Correction 569-70 (1960). 
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constitute an idealized father image with whom the 
probationer can identify. . . .39 
In 1957, the National Probation and Parole Advisory 
Council on Judges spoke to the many benefits of probation: 
Probation enables the offender to reshape his life in the 
framework of normal living conditions; it preserves family 
life and other normal social relationships; it enables the 
offender to carry out his responsibilities by supporting 
himself and his family. 
Probation avoids the shattering impact of imprisonment on 
personality; it avoids imprisonment’s stimulation of hatred 
and law-abiding society; it avoids confining the reformable 
offender with hardened criminals who might have a 
contaminating effect on him; [and] it avoids the stigma 
attached to imprisonment.40 
In terms of specific services, probation afforded a 
considerable variety, including help with employment, 
public relief, and medical care; “special diets”; institutional 
placements for needy family members; legal aid; help in 
finding options for education, vocations and recreation; and 
psychotherapeutic and religious services.41  Underscoring 
the reformist tenor of probation, a literature review 
canvassing writings on probation between 1910 and 1960 
identified “case work” and “treatment” as the dominant 
methodologies.42 
 
 39. Id. at 572-73. 
 40. National Probation and Parole Association Advisory Council for Judges, 
Guides for Sentencing 16 (1957). 
 41. Tappan, supra note 38, at 573 (citing David Dressler, Probation and 
Parole 160-65 (1951)). 
 42. See Lewis Diana, What is Probation?, 51 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Pol. 
Sci. 189, 192-97 (1960). The author concluded that 
in all cases probation is seen as a social as well as a legal process, as a 
method of supervision and guidance in which all available community 
resources are used, and as a process which should aim at the total 
adjustment of the offender. 
As culled from the professional literature, then, probation may be thought 
of as the application of modern, scientific case work to specially selected 
offenders who are placed by the court under the personal supervision of a 
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B. The Codification Efforts of the Model Penal Code 
The Model Penal Code’s probation provisions, taking 
nascent form in the 1950s,43 bear the unmistakable 
earmarks of the foregoing history.  Part I, section 7.01 of 
the Code addresses the critically important threshold 
question of whether probation rather than imprisonment 
should be imposed.44  Underscoring the central sway of 
probation within the Institute, section 7.01(1) prescribes 
that a court “shall” not impose a term of imprisonment 
unless 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime 
and history, character of the defendant, it is of the opinion 
that his imprisonment is necessary for protection of the 
public because: 
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a 
suspended sentence or probation the defendant will 
commit another crime; or 
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment 
that can be provided most effectively by his 
commitment to an institution; or 
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of 
the defendant’s crime.45 
The probation-as-default approach, in the words of 
Sanford Bates, Special Consultant for the Code’s 
sentencing provisions, would “be found to be new in most 
states.”46  Indeed, the original drafts of section 7.01(1) 
 
probation officer . . . and given treatment aimed at their complete and 
permanent social rehabilitation. 
Id. at 197.  See also id. at 202 (noting that “[i]nsight by the probationer into the 
reasons for his behavior is the major goal of treatment”). 
 43. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1097, 1097 (1952) (noting that the Institute’s efforts commenced in 1951). 
 44. See Model Penal Code § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (entitled 
“Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprisonment and for Placing Defendant on 
Probation”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Sanford Bates, Treatment and Correction of Criminals as Proposed by the 
Model Penal Code, 39 Notre Dame L. Rev. 288, 289 (1964).  On this point 
Reporter Herbert Wechsler stated around the time of the Code’s publication: 
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provided only that a court “may” impose probation “if, 
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime 
and to the history and character of the defendant, it deems 
that his imprisonment is unnecessary for protection of the 
public,”47 based on identified criteria relating to the offense 
and offender (similar to those in the final Code).48  The 
criteria found their way into the ultimate version despite 
worries that their codification would discourage use of 
probation,49 spawn challenges by defense counsel, and 
possibly lead to their “routine, mechanized use.”50  
Ultimately, according to Sanford Bates, the criteria were 
inserted to “avoid criticism of this part of the Code as being 
 
Were it not for the accident of history that prisons emerged as a humane 
substitute for death or transportation . . . would the sense that 
imprisonment is somehow the right penal sanction, rather than the grave 
exception, ever have attained the influence it has?  In many jurisdictions, 
practice is approaching the correction of this most unfortunate inversion.  
The Code provisions would articulate and ratify what the best practice 
already has achieved. 
Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 465, 472 (1961).  For a contrary view on the presumptive use of probation 
see William B. Herlands, When and How Should a Sentencing Judge Use 
Probation, 35 F.R.D. 487, 497 (1964). 
 47. See Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 2, § 7.01(1) at 3 (May 3, 1954); 
Tentative Draft No. 4, § 7.01(1) at 47 (Apr. 25, 1955).  See also Will C. Turnbladh, 
A Critique of the Model Penal Code Sentencing Proposals, 23 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 544, 548 (1958) (asserting that “[t]he Code originally articulated what 
amounted to a presumption in favor of imprisonment. . . ”). 
 48. Mindful of the enormous discretionary authority afforded courts in the 
probation decision, the drafters explained that the criteria 
should serve to promote both the thoughtfulness and the consistency of 
dispositions, while distributing responsibility between the legislature and 
the court.  This is the normal procedure in other fields involving large 
discretionary powers; there seems no reason why it should not be 
attempted here. 
Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 47, § 7.01 cmt. at 34.  The 
drafters offered that the criteria “should strengthen the hand of the Court in 
ordering [non-prison] dispositions when it deems them proper, a result we would 
hope to bring about.”  Id. at 35. 
 49. Id.  The 1985 Commentary observes that the Tentative Draft was 
“substantially revised” at the Council’s March 1958 meeting to reflect explicit 
priority for non-imprisonment “unless there is a special reason for an 
institutional commitment.”  Model Penal Code § 7.01 cmt. at 221 (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985). 
 50. Turnbladh, supra note 47, at 549. 
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too lenient.”51  To Bates, “the prima facie use of 
probation . . . as the normal method of disposition, rather 
than confinement, represents an outstanding change in 
philosophy.  It is to be expected that its operation would 
materially reduce the number of persons being sent to 
prison and jail, and, consequently, lead to the more 
humane treatment of criminal offenders.”52 
Section 7.01(2) added an extensive list of considerations 
that, while neither mandatory nor exclusive, should be 
weighed by the court in favor of granting probation: 
(a) the defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor 
threatened serious harm; 
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal 
conduct would cause or threaten serious harm; 
(c) the defendant acted under strong provocation; 
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or 
justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing 
to establish a defense; 
(e) the victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced 
or facilitated its commission; 
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the 
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury 
that he sustained; 
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or 
criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a 
substantial period of time before the commission of the 
present crime; 
(h) the defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of 
circumstances unlikely to recur; 
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate 
that he is unlikely to commit another crime; 
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond 
affirmatively to probationary treatment; 
 
 51. Bates, supra note 46, at 289. 
 52. Id. at 290.  See also id. at 289 (observing that the Code provisions provide 
a “clear indication that the guilty defendant should be sentenced to imprisonment 
only as a last resort”). 
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(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail 
excessive hardship to himself or his dependants.53 
While providing more guidance than then-existing 
laws,54 the Code’s probation provisions afforded scant insight 
into the purpose(s) thought to be served in the threshold 
decision of whether prison or probation is warranted.  The 
main guidance is found in section 7.01(1), posing the 
question of whether a prison term is “necessary for the 
protection of the public.”55  In subsection (3), the only 
affirmative language relating to the grant of probation, the 
Code vaguely provides that in the event prison is not 
imposed “the Court shall place [an offender] on probation if 
he is in need of the supervision, guidance, assistance, or 
direction that the probation service can provide.”56 
The Commentary to section 7.01, without apparent 
reference to probation, adds that the “criteria for 
 
 53. Model Penal Code § 7.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 54. See, e.g., Ariz. Stat. § 13-1657 (1960) (authorizing probation “[i]f it appears 
that there are circumstances in mitigation of the punishment, or that if the ends of 
justice will be subserved thereby”); Del. Stat. § 39-16-6 (1960) (authorizing 
probation “[w]hen it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of 
justice and the best interests of the public, as well as the defendant, will be best 
served thereby”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 62-2203 (1958) (providing no criteria); Mich. 
Stat. Ann. § 28.1131 (1954) (authorizing probation if “it appears to the satisfaction 
of the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in an offensive or 
criminal course of conduct and that the public good does not require that the 
defendant shall suffer the penalty imposed by law”); Va. Code § 53-272 (1958) 
(authorizing probation “if there are circumstances in mitigation of the offense, or if 
it appears compatible with the public interest”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.01(1) (1957) 
(authorizing probation when “it appears to the court from his character and the 
circumstances of the case that he is not likely again to commit crime and that the 
public welfare does not require that he shall suffer the penalty of the law”). 
 55. The final text of section 7.01, it bears mention, marked an improvement 
over the Tentative Draft, which directed merely that probation should be used 
only if prison is “unnecessary for protection of the public,” without providing any 
criteria.  See Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 2 Code § 7.01, at 33 (May 3, 
1954).  The Comment to the Tentative Draft added that the enumerated factors 
militating against prison “relate primarily to the question whether the defendant 
is a source of danger to the public but they have some bearing also on the relative 
necessity of a strong sanction for deterrent purposes.”  Id. at 34.  The drafters also 
mention that “[s]ince the exercise of discretionary power is involved,” section 
1.02(2), containing the broad “general purposes” of sentencing, “is relevant.”  Id. 
at 35. 
 56. Model Penal Code § 7.01(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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sentencing offenders to prison are obviously closely related 
to broader principles regarding the appropriate aims of 
criminal punishment,” set forth in section 1.02(2).57  Having 
disavowed retribution (characterized as “unwarranted and 
inhumane”) and “vengeance pure and simple,”58 section 
1.02(2) identifies the following as “general purpose[s]” to 
guide sentencing dispositions: 
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses; 
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of 
offenders; 
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, 
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment; 
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that 
may be imposed on conviction of an offense; 
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just 
individualization in their treatment. . . .59 
 
 57. Model Penal Code § 7.01 cmt. at 227 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
 58. Id.  Elaborating on the Code’s philosophical framework, Code Reporter 
Herbert Wechsler observed in 1961: 
Deterrence (both general and specific), incapacitation, and correction are 
all possible objectives of the sanctions that may be employed in dealing 
with offenders; all are means to crime prevention and as such are entitled 
to be weighed.  But not even crime prevention is the sole value to be served.  
The rehabilitation of an individual . . . is in itself a social value of 
importance, a value . . . that is and ought to be the prime goal of 
correctional administration and that often will be sacrificed unduly if the 
choice of sanctions is dictated only by deterrence. 
Wechsler, supra note 46, at 468. 
In 1970, the American Bar Association offered that “[s]entencing is in large 
part concerned with avoiding future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live 
productively in the community which he has offended against.”  American Bar 
Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to 
Probation 1 (Approved Draft 1970).  See also President’s Commission, Corrections 
28 (1967) (“The correctional strategy that presently seems to hold the greatest 
promise, based on social science theory and limited research, is that of 
reintegrating the offender into the community . . . .  There is little doubt that the 
goals of reintegration are furthered much more readily by working with an 
offender in the community than by incarcerating him.”). 
 59. Model Penal Code § 1.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  In the 
subsequent provisions (omitted), the Code proceeds to identify broader 
institutional goals, such as the coordination of the functions of courts and 
agencies in the sentencing process.  See Model Penal Code § 1.02(f)-(h) (Proposed 
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The drafters elaborated on the Code’s core sentencing 
purpose: 
The section is drafted in the view that sentencing and 
treatment policy should serve the end of crime prevention.  
It does not undertake, however, to state a fixed priority 
among the means to such prevention, i.e., the deterrence of 
potential criminals and the incapacitation and correction of 
the individual offender.  These are all proper goals to be 
pursued in social action with respect to the offender, one or 
another of which may call for the larger emphasis in a 
particular context or situation.60 
Taken together, sections 1.02 and 7.01, contained in 
Part I of the Code, provided a confusing standard on which 
to base the important threshold decision of whether 
probation is warranted.  While the architecture of the 
provisions purports to regard probation as the default 
option, the pivotal considerations set forth in 7.01(1) 
incongruously pertain to whether prison is advisable.  While 
perhaps explainable as a political compromise amid the 
wrangling that doubtless occurred in Institute deliberations, 
the approach plainly disserves the affirmative and purposive 
consideration of probation.  Similarly, the Code’s 
recognition, buried in the Commentary, that the 
“appropriate aims of criminal punishment” (the “general 
purposes” contained in section 1.02(2)) are “closely related” 
to sentencing decisions, provided precious little more 
guidance, given the loose connection between the 
considerations set forth in 7.01 and 1.02.61  Adding to this 
indeterminacy, the Code disclaims any requirement that 
 
Official Draft 1962). 
 60. Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 2, Code § 1.02(2) cmt. at 4 (May 3, 
1954). 
 61. For instance, while section 7.01(1)(c) expresses concern that probation 
might “depreciate the seriousness” of a crime, the closest apparent corollary 
provision is found in section 1.02(2)(a), identifying a general purpose of 
sentencing and treatment as “prevent[ing] the commission of offenses.”  See 
Model Penal Code § 1.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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judges “state the reason for their sentence” or that appellate 
review of probation be required.62 
Finally, the Code’s provision (in Part III) intended to 
provide guidance on the conditions that might be imposed 
in the event probation is imposed is almost entirely devoid 
of any guiding purpose.  Section 301.1(1) counsels only that 
the court “shall attach such reasonable conditions . . . as it 
deems necessary to insure that [the probationer] will lead a 
law-abiding life or likely to assist him to do so.”63  Section 
301.1(2) proceeds to specify a series of potential 
conditions,64 adding that the court can impose “any other 
conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the 
defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or 
incompatible with his freedom of conscience.”65 
Whether owing to the Code or not, probation became 
ever more popular in the ensuing decades.66  However, 
 
 62. Model Penal Code § 7.01 cmt. at 223 n.1; § 301.1 cmt. at 145 (Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985). 
 63. Model Penal Code § 301.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  See also 
Model Penal Code § 301.1, cmt. at 203 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985) (stating that “[c]onditions are to be set by the sentencing judge in light of 
what is appropriate for the individual defendant”). 
 64. The specified potential conditions include such things as requiring the 
offender “to meet his family responsibilities” and undergo vocational training, or 
forego carrying weapons or interactions with “disreputable” persons.  See Model 
Penal Code § 301.2(a)-(k) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 65. Model Penal Code § 301.1(2)(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  The 
“detailed Comment” referenced in the Commentary, contained in Tentative Draft 
No. 2 at 141, 145 (1954), elaborates that “[s]ince no specification of permissible 
conditions can exhaust the measures that may be appropriate in what is meant to 
be a flexible device for dealing with offenders, the section includes a residual 
clause creating broad authority.”  “To guard against abuse that sometimes has 
occurred, the clause excludes conditions ‘unduly restrictive’ of the offender’s 
liberty or ‘incompatible with his freedom of conscience.’”  Id.  The Draft adds that 
it foresaw “no reason why conditions which are thus abusive should not be subject 
to review,” but as noted refrained from incorporating an express right of appeal.  
Id. 
 66. See Margaret Werner Cahalan & Lee Anne Parsons, Historical 
Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984 tbls. 7-7B to 7-8B (1987).  
For additional information on probation during the era see Robert Dawson’s 
report for the American Bar Foundation, part of its comprehensive Survey of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in the 1950s and 1960s.  Robert O. Dawson, 
Sentencing: The Decision as to Type, Length, and Conditions of Sentence 67-141 
(1969). 
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starting in the mid-1960s, concern arose over the broad 
authority of courts in their probation decisions.  This 
concern stemmed not so much from standard conditions 
often mandated in state laws, such as the requirement of 
law-abidingness and restrictions on physical movement 
that also appear in the Code, but rather the gamut of 
discretionary conditions that courts were free to impose.  
Writing in 1963, for instance, two commentators canvassed 
the many creative conditions, including limits on 
procreation, freedom of association, and speech, and 
expressed alarm: 
Because the trial courts are under very little restraint as to 
the conditions which they may impose as concomitants of 
the probation grant, because all too few procedural 
safeguards are provided the offender, and because there is a 
general reluctance on the part of reviewing courts to inquire 
into the purpose of conditions already imposed, probation 
may be used as a vehicle for ends wholly unrelated to the 
reformation of the offender.  Of even greater concern, 
moreover, is the danger that in permitting such latitude in 
imposing conditions, the purpose and effect of probation 
may be negated.67 
This judicial authority derived from expansive grants 
of discretion afforded by statutory law, evidenced before68 
 
 67. Judah Best & Paul I. Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 
Geo. L.J. 809, 811 (1963). 
 68. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 3651 (1958) (“for such period and upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems best”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1657 (1956) 
(“upon such terms and conditions as the court determines”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 
11, § 4321 (1953) (“upon such terms and conditions in conformity with this article 
as [the court] may deem best”); Idaho Code § 19-2601 (Supp. 1961) (“under such 
terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and expedient”); Ind. Ann. 
Stat. § 9-2210 (1956) (conditions the court “may deem best”); Md. Code Ann. art. 
27, § 639 (1957) (“as may be deemed proper by the court”); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 276, § 87 (1959) (“for such time and upon such conditions as [the court] deems 
proper”); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-19-8 (1956) (“for such time and on such terms 
and conditions as the court may fix”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28 § 1008 (1959) (“upon 
such terms and conditions as the court determines”); Va. Code Ann. § 53-272 
(1958) (“for such time and under such conditions of probation as the court shall 
determine”).  For further examples, see Note, A Trial Judge’s Freedom and 
Responsibility in Administering Probation, 71 Yale L.J. 551, 554-56 (1961). 
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and after the Code’s adoption,69 which the Code’s modest 
admonition in section 301.1(2)(l) that conditions be 
“reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant” 
did nothing to remedy.70  Indeed, by 1967 only one state 
(Louisiana) had codified even this broad limiting principle 
relating to purpose.71 
Nor was the specter of abuse ameliorated by the 
prospect of appellate review, which, again, was not 
something contained in the Code.  Even when undertaken, 
appellate review was limited by three factors: (1) deference 
to the expansive statutory authority afforded sentencing 
courts; (2) the ambiguity of the expectation that conditions 
be “reasonable”; and (3) the view that probationers should 
not be permitted to contest conditions because they 
“consented” to them.72 
II.  PROBATION WEATHERS THE “GET TOUGH” REVOLUTION 
For roughly a decade after the Code’s publication in 
1962, its view that corrections should be individualized and 
serve rehabilitative and preventive purposes held central 
sway.  All this changed in the mid-1970s, of course, with 
Robert Martinson’s What Works (1974), a meta-analysis of 
 
 69. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 43-2324 (1964) (such “conditions as the [court] 
shall deem proper and reasonable as to the probation of the person convicted”); 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.135 (1964) (authorizing probation “on such terms as the 
court shall determine”); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1133 (Supp. 1965) (such conditions 
“as the circumstances of the case may require or warrant”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2951.02 (1971) (“Upon such terms as judge or magistrate determines”); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 19, § 1081 (1964) (“on such terms and conditions as it may deem right 
and proper”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2902 (Supp. 1964) (conditions the court “shall 
deem fit and proper”); Vt. Code R. 17 § 1008 (1960) (“upon such conditions and for 
such time as [the court] may prescribe”); Va. Code Ann. § 53-272 (1958) (such 
“conditions . . . as the court shall determine”).  See also Dawson, supra note 66, at 
117 (noting that “[t]he latitude afforded the trial judge to devise and impose 
probation conditions on a case-by-case basis is virtually unlimited, because 
statutes typically grant him broad discretion to impose any condition he thinks 
proper”). 
 70. See Model Penal Code § 301.1(2)(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 71. Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 186 
(1967). 
 72. Best & Birzon, supra note 67, at 831-32. 
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recidivism studies indicating widespread ineffectiveness of 
rehabilitative efforts.73  Although Martinson later tried to 
qualify his conclusion that “nothing works,”74 the gloomy 
assessment quickly caught on with the public and 
politicians.  Soon the “rehabilitative ideal” receded75 and 
criminal justice policy unabashedly dedicated itself to 
punishment and incapacitation;76 corrections decisions, 
rather than focusing on the redeemability of offenders, 
came to turn largely on severity of offenses.77  Jurisdictions 
rushed to embrace determinate sentencing in lieu of the 
discretionary, indeterminate approaches endorsed by the 
Code.  Testament to this shift is a single remarkable 
statistic: from 1962 to 2001 the U.S. prison and jail 
population increased six-fold in number.78  In June 2002, 
the number of incarcerated individuals exceeded two 
million.79 
Given this sea-change it would stand to reason that 
the discretionary, rehabilitation-based traditions of 
probation would have met their end.  The data, however, 
 
 73. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison 
Reform, 42 Pub. Int. 22 (1974) (concluding that “[w]ith few and isolated 
exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no 
appreciable effect on recidivism”). 
 74. See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution 
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 243, 252 (1979). 
 75. See generally Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: 
Penal Policy and Social Purpose (1981); Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of 
Retribution—An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 781.  See also 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (stating that 
“anticipations and hopes for rehabilitation programs have fallen short of 
expectations of a generation ago”). 
 76. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in 
American History 304-08 (1993).  For discussion of the “revival” of retributivism 
after its reported death in the 1950s and 1960s, see Russell L. Christopher, 
Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
843 (2002); Michelle A. Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1313 (2000). 
 77. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 305-06. 
 78. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001 tbl. 6.23 (Kathleen Maguire 
& Ann L. Pastore eds., 2002). 
 79. Paige M. Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2002, at 1 (2003). 
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reveal a far different reality.  In 2001, of the almost 6.6 
million adults in the U.S. subject to correctional 
supervision, 60% were on probation, 30% were in prison or 
jail, and the remainder on parole.80  The proportion of adult 
probationers increased nationwide 2.8% 2000-2001, a 3.4% 
increase over 1995.81  Fifty-three percent of probationers in 
2000 were convicted of a felony, a 5% increase over 1990.82 
The survival—indeed flourishing—of probation, 
however, was not mere happenstance; rather, it occurred as 
a result of probation adapting to the unabashedly more 
punitive times in which it was obliged to operate.83  In the 
1980s the “Justice Model” of probation became popular,84 
 
 80. Lauren E. Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2001, at 1 
(2002). 
 81. Id. at 3.  See also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates, 
1995 (1996) (noting 177% increase in use of adult probation 1980-1995). 
 82. Glaze, supra note 80, at 4.  See generally Richard J. Kohler & Charles 
Linder, Alternative Incarceration: An Inevitable Response to Institutional 
Overcrowding, 56 Fed. Probation 12 (1992). 
 83. As noted by one veteran of the Los Angeles corrections community, his 
department “both survived and thrived” by redressing a central “credibility” 
problem: 
We stopped the “probation as pendulum” syndrome (swinging between 
social work and criminal justice, depending on the mood of the times).  We 
placed probation once and for all in the context of criminal justice.  
Probation is a form of criminal sanction, defined by Webster as a coercive 
intervention intended to enforce the law.  Under this definition, our work, 
whether we are rehabilitating probationers or incarcerating them, is 
clearly that of sanction, not social work. 
Barry J. Nidorf, Surviving in a “Lock Them Up” Era, 60 Fed. Probation 4, 5 
(1996).  For a similar expression of the public relations need to change with the 
times see Walter L. Barkdull, Probation: Call It Control and Mean It, 51 Fed. 
Probation 50 (1987).  The author, an employee of the California Department of 
Corrections, offered: 
Community control affords a broad range of sanctions short of prison.  
Community control provides a degree of offender isolation.  Community 
control can be incapacitating.  Community control punishes.  Not only is 
there nothing wrong in thinking of probation or community corrections in 
these terms—it is absolutely essential that we do so.  Moreover, we must 
assist the public to view community control in these terms.  Punitive terms. 
Id. at 53.  For more on this shift, see Peter J. Benekos, Beyond Reintegration: 
Community Corrections in a Retributive Era, 54 Fed. Probation 52 (1990). 
 84. See Dean J. Champion, Probation and Parole in the United States 19 
(1990) (describing Model as one that “stresses fair and equitable treatment as 
well as punishment to fit the offense(s)”).  See also Klein, supra note 37, at 74 
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and the field came to be populated with a variety of more 
aggressive probation strategies, collectively known as 
intermediate sanctions inasmuch as they constitute a 
middle ground between unsupervised release and 
imprisonment.  In an influential 1985 report Rand 
Corporation researchers made the case for intermediate 
sanctions: 
We believe the criminal justice system needs an alternative, 
intermediate form of punishment for those offenders who 
are too antisocial for the relative freedom that probation 
now offers, but not so seriously criminal as to require 
imprisonment.  A sanction is needed that would impose 
intensive surveillance, coupled with substantial community 
service and restitution.  It should be structured to satisfy 
public demands that the punishment fit the crime, to show 
that crime really does not pay, and to control potential 
recidivists.85 
Consistent with this orientation, probation sanctions 
in ensuing years assumed an increasingly punitive 
character, including “split sentences” and “shock” probation 
(involving brief prison or jail terms); boot camps; intensive 
supervision; house arrest and electronic monitoring; 
halfway houses; day-reporting centers; community service; 
restitution; day fine programs; weekend sentencing; and 
enhanced monetary penalties.86  Eventually, many of the 
approaches were criticized, in part because of the high 
volumes of “technical” violations (e.g., drug or alcohol use) 
generated as a result of the more intensive surveillance 
associated.87  Others, however, especially those with ample 
 
(recounting Model’s rise in popularity). 
 85. Joan Petersilia et al., Granting Felons Probation ix (1985) (citation 
omitted). 
 86. See generally Intermediate Sanctions in Overcrowded Times (Michael 
Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 100-33 
(1996); Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 Crime & Just. 
99 (1996). 
 87. See Joan Petersilia, Reforming Probation and Parole in the Twenty-First 
Century 68-70 (2002); Janet L. Jackson et al., A Critical Look at Research on 
Alternatives to Custody, 59 Fed. Probation 43 (1995). 
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funding for treatment and services, received positive 
reports and enjoy continued use.88  Testament to the 
increased harshness of the techniques are data indicating 
that, if provided with a choice, many offenders will choose a 
prison term over the prospect of being subject to 
intermediate sanctions.89 
“Shaming” sanctions, likewise, captured the attention 
of community corrections in the early-mid 1990s.90  
Designed to bring public ridicule to offenders in their 
communities, the sanctions assumed innovative forms 
including requiring that bumper stickers be affixed to the 
cars of drunk drivers proclaiming their conviction, wearing 
of “sandwich board” signs proclaiming guilt of specified 
crime, and public apologies in newspapers.91  Shame in 
itself of course was not in the least new to the correctional 
arsenal, being the direct descendant of Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s 1850 novel The Scarlet Letter and techniques 
applied centuries before.92  To the public and many 
sentencing judges, however, shame sanctions proved 
enormously popular.  Writing in 1991, Toni Massaro traced 
the popularity of the sanctions to the “profound and 
widespread dissatisfaction with existing methods of 
 
 88. Petersilia, supra note 87, at 70. 
 89. Id. at 71-73. 
 90. For examples of popular commentary on their emergence, see, e.g., 
Jonathan Alter & Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, Newsweek, Feb. 6, 1995, at 
20; Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 16, 1997, at A1; Henry J. Reske, Scarlet Letter Sentences, A.B.A. J., Jan. 
1996, at 16. 
 91. For academic commentary on shame sanctions, much of it critical, see, 
e.g., Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?  
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 2157 (2001); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: 
A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 Duke L.J. 1357; Jeffrey 
C. Filcik, Note, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 Wash. 
U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 291 (1990).  In what has become a standard resource in 
the area, Professor Dan Kahan vigorously defended shame sanctions on just this 
basis, arguing that shame sanctions enjoy superior public condemnatory value 
over options such as fines and community service.  See Dan Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996). 
 92. See generally Alice Morse Earle, Curious Punishments of Bygone Days 
(1896). 
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punishment.”93  In practical terms, the sanctions had 
appeal because they promised to free up increasingly scarce 
(and expensive) prison and jail space94 and resonated with 
a public partial to the “gotcha” value of subjecting criminal 
offenders to public ridicule.95 
Taken altogether, the changes in American criminal 
justice over the past forty years have been deep and wide.96  
Today, a far richer variety of sentencing options is 
available to probation decision makers.  No longer does the 
decision to grant probation mean, as one commentator 
observed in 1969, “the difference between almost total 
freedom in the community and almost total control in the 
typical maximum security prison.”97  Rather, sentencing 
courts have at their disposal any number of non-
incarcerative sanctions, including those of a decidedly more 
intrusive nature, reflecting the “continuum of sanctions” 
advocated by Norval Morris and Michael Tonry in 1990.98 
 
 93. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and the American Law, 89 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1880, 1884-86 (1991).  To a considerable extent, this dissatisfaction stemmed 
from public disappointment over the seeming futility of not just prison but also 
community-based sanctions.  In 1933, Sheldon Glueck warned against the 
“boomerang” effect of overselling probation in particular: 
When probation first became an organized movement, and even now as it 
reaches maturity, grossly unwarranted claims as to the miracles it can 
work were and are being made.  Propagandist methods borrowed from 
mercantile fields, instead of dignified educational programs, have too often 
been used “to sell” probation to various judges and communities . . . .  
Every overstatement . . . will sooner or later prove a boomerang; and if 
claims for probation are carried too far, the popular resentment over 
instances of its failure will be all the more unbridled. 
Sheldon Glueck, The Significance and Promise of Probation, in Probation and 
Criminal Justice: Essays in Honor of Herbert C. Parsons, supra note 25, at 9-10. 
 94. See Brilliant, supra note 91, at 1370. 
 95. See Developments in the Law, Alternative Punishments: Resistance and 
Inroads, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1967, 1981-83 (1998) (surveying positive public 
response to shaming sanctions imposed by Texas District Court Judge Ted Poe). 
 96. For a discussion of how these changes are reflected in the work of 
contemporary probation officers, with special emphasis on the federal system, see 
Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 Yale L.J. 933 (1995). 
 97. See Dawson, supra note 66, at 71. 
 98. Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation: 
Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 40-41 (1990).  As 
noted by the authors: “There is a pernicious tendency to think of criminal 
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These new probation options suggest the presence of a 
far richer gamut of goals and purposes as well,99 consistent 
with the increasingly punitive and control-oriented cast of 
American justice.100  While of course even in 1962 
rehabilitation was not the unalloyed raison d’ etre of 
probation (e.g., in many states “split sentences” were 
permitted101 and “surveillance” and “control” were accepted 
 
sanctions as either punishment or treatment, either pain or beneficent assistance, 
either the prison and the jail or the psychiatrist and the social worker.”  Id. at 
176. The reality of this expansiveness is illustrated by the American Bar 
Association’s use of the more inclusive term “compliance programs” in lieu of 
probation.  American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Sentencing, stnd. 18-3.13 & cmt. (3d ed. 1994).  See also Klein, supra note 37, chs. 
4-9 (surveying varieties of non-incarcerative strategies); David B. Rottman et al., 
State Court Organization 1998 tbl. 47 at 303 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 2000) 
(providing state-by-state overview of varieties of sanctions available). 
 99. In 1960, for instance, a review of the probation literature over the 
preceding fifty years revealed only a single writer who “made punishment the 
dominant note in his theory of probation.”  Diana, supra note 42, at 190 (citing 
Almy, Probation as Punishment, 24 Survey 657 (1910)).  The review noted that a 
survey of twenty probation officers conducted three years before revealed that 
only one officer stated that punishment was “even an aspect” of probation, and 
that only one other offered that “supervision alone was the real aim of probation.”  
Id. at 201.  Despite these findings, it is acknowledged that probation officers 
themselves have long felt role conflict between the public safety and 
rehabilitative purposes of probation.  See Thomas Ellsworth, Identifying the 
Actual and Preferred Goals of Probation, 54 Fed. Probation 10 (1990). 
A more recent examination of the specified statutory functions of probation 
officers sheds further light on the evolution: officers today are more likely to be 
statutorily mandated to perform law enforcement-related tasks than tasks 
relating to the reform of offenders.  Marcus Purkiss et al., Probation Officer 
Functions—A Statutory Analysis, 67 Fed. Probation 12 (2003).  The study also 
found that, compared to a previous 1992 review of probation statutes, the duties 
of officers were becoming “more heterogeneous—the task of rehabilitation is 
beginning to reappear in statutes.”  Id. at 13.  On this basis the authors conclude 
that “[a]ll told, it appears that the goals of probation are becoming more balanced 
than they were in 1992,” a shift they attribute to the possible tempering influence 
of restorative justice and political efforts by probation officers in state 
legislatures.  Id. at 23. 
 100. See generally David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social 
Order in Contemporary Society (2001); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing 
Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some 
Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Joachim J. Savelsberg, 
Cultures of Control in Contemporary Societies, 27 Law & Soc. Inq. 685 (2002). 
 101. See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1133 (Supp. 1954); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 56.08 
(1957). 
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purposes102), today the de facto purposes of probation 
extend well beyond the paternalistic care and treatment of 
offenders.103  While many such strategies have positive 
effects in reducing recidivism,104 and thus have 
rehabilitative merit, there is no mistaking that they are 
also serving, purposefully so, retributive, deterrent, and 
incapacitative goals.105 
Given that probation is a creature of statute, one 
would hope to see such massive changes reflected in the 
statute books.  A review of the laws establishes, however, 
that little has changed since 1962.  The discretion of courts 
to grant probation is as expansive as it was at the time of 
the Code, and purpose remains wanting.  Laws commonly 
provide merely that courts have the authority to grant 
 
 102. Dawson, supra note 66, at 123-26.  See also Heinz R. Hink, The 
Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 483, 494 (1962) (expressing concern over “increased use of probation as a 
modern substitute for traditional forms of legal punishment”). 
 103. R.A. Duff recently urged recognition of a perhaps more pragmatic view of 
probation: 
probation, properly understood, should ideally constitute not an alternative 
to punishment, a non-punitive cuckoo in the penal nest, but a paradigm of 
punishment—of what punishment ought to be. 
[P]robation should be justified and administered as punishment: as 
something that is imposed on or required of offenders, for the offences they 
have committed, and that it is intended to be burdensome or painful.  The 
very purpose or intention of probation should, that is, be punitive: but once 
we get clear about the nature and the significance of the burden or pain 
that such punishment should involve, we will be able to see that its 
purpose is not “merely punitive” . . . . 
R.A. Duff, Probation, Punishment and Restorative Justice: Should Al Turism Be 
Engaged in Punishment, 42 Howard J. Crim. Just. 181, 182-83 (2003). 
 104. See, e.g., James Byrne & April Pattavina, The Effectiveness Issue: 
Assessing What Works in the Adult Community Corrections System, in Smart-
sentencing: The Emergence of Intermediate Sanctions at 281-306 (James Byrne 
et al. eds., 1992). 
 105. As noted by the leading treatise in the field, “[i]t cannot be doubted that 
some probation terms . . . , imposed as a sanction for criminal activity, involve the 
infliction of punishment and are designed to do so.”  Cohen, supra note 4, § 7:6, at 
7-10.  See also James Byrne & Mary Brewster, Choosing the Future of American 
Corrections: Punishment or Reform?, 57 Fed. Probation 3, 5-8 (1993); Richard D. 
Sluder et al., Guiding Philosophies for Probation in the Twenty-First Century, 58 
Fed. Probation 3, 4-5 (1994). 
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probation106 or provide only the vaguest of criteria to guide 
decisions.107  The Federal Probation Act, for instance, 
provides that 
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court . . . 
when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest 
of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, 
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. . . .108 
Others laws, much like Code section 7.01(1), allude to 
general considerations favoring the use of prison,109 and 
enumerate specific offense and offender traits favoring 
probation.110  Even when limits are in place, however, as 
one treatise notes, their influence is “more apparent than 
real” given that consideration of the factors is not 
mandated and jurisdictions typically do not require that 
courts specify their reasons on the threshold question of 
probation availability.111 
The statutory situation is no more illuminating 
relative to the purposes of particular conditions.  While 
very often statutory law (like Code section 301.1) 
enumerates conditions that might be imposed,112 it is 
usually silent on purpose.113  Very often, again as in the 
 
 106. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-901 (2003); Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 991a (2003); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28 § 205 (2000); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303 (2003); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(2) (2003); W.Va. Code secs. 62-12-1, 62-12-2 (2000); Wash. Rev. 
Code § 9.95.200 (2003). 
 107. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-34(c) (2003) (when the “ends of justice and 
the welfare of society” do not require imprisonment); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 651:2(V) 
(2003) (if defendant is “in need of the supervision and guidance that the probation 
service can provide”); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(a) (2003) (when probation “not 
inconsistent with the ends of justice”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.533(2) (2003) (if 
probation “in the interests of justice and of benefit to the person and the 
community”). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (2002). 
 109. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §  5-4-301(b) (1999). 
 110. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-203 (1998); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 706-
620 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02(a) (2003). 
 111. Cohen, supra note 4, § 2:24 at 2-24. 
 112. Id. §§ 7:13 to 7:14 at 7-22- to 7-27. 
 113. As noted by Professor Cohen, “few statutes specify the goals to be served 
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Code,114 statutory law contains very broad grants of 
authority without much guidance.  Missouri law, for 
instance, provides only that “the conditions of probation 
shall be such as the court in its discretion deems 
reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will not 
again violate the law.”115  Arkansas states that conditions 
should be “reasonably necessary to assist the defendant in 
leading a law-abiding life.”116  Idaho prescribes that a court 
can impose probation subject to “such terms and conditions 
as it deems necessary and expedient.”117  Virginia law 
provides that a court “may place the accused on probation 
under such conditions as the court shall determine.”118 
To the limited extent that statutory law identifies 
purpose in conditions, it sounds in the traditional purposes 
of rehabilitation and public safety,119 very often advanced in 
tandem.120  Although a handful of jurisdictions ambiguously 
identify “doing justice” as a goal,121 punishment is rarely 
 
by conditions.”  Id. § 7:1 at 7-4.  See also id. at 7:32 at 7-63 (noting that “few 
probation . . . laws specifically describe the ends which conditions should 
address”). 
 114. See Model Penal Code § 3.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (authorizing 
“reasonable conditions . . . . as [the court] deems necessary to insure that [the 
probationer] will lead a law-abiding life or likely assist him to do so”). 
 115. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.021 (2002). 
 116. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-303(a) (2002).  See also N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-
07(2) (2003) (“reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-
abiding life or to assist the defendant to do so”). 
 117. Idaho Code § 19-2601(2) (2002). 
 118. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-303 (2000).  See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 1A 
(2003) (“place [offender] on probation for such time and on such terms and 
conditions as it shall fix”). 
 119. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.540(2) (2003) (conditions designed “for the 
protection of the public or reformation of the offender or both”); Tex. Code Crim. 
Proc. art. 42.12 § 11(a) (2004) (“the judge may impose any reasonable condition 
that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, 
or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 907.6 (2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.540 (2003).  
Montana’s catch-all provision provides that courts can impose conditions that 
serve rehabilitation or “protection of the victim or society.”  Mont. Code Ann. § 46-
18-201(4)(n) (2003).  The commentary adds that “[t]he conditions which may be 
imposed are left entirely to the imagination of the individual judge.”  Id. at cmt. 
 121. See Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1(j) (2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2951.02(C)(1)(a) (2003). 
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expressly identified, a glaring omission given the array of 
avowedly punitive probationary sanctions in use today. 
This absence of statutory guidance has created 
understandable difficulties for the appellate courts over the 
years.  Most recently, judicial discretion to impose shame 
sanctions has dominated critical commentary and 
concern.122  Before that, criticisms were voiced over the 
imposition of creative conditions that infringed on the 
constitutional rights of probationers,123 a concern that 
endures today.124 
Without statutory guidance and any requirement that 
sentencing courts specify the reasons supporting imposition 
of particular conditions, reviewing courts have resorted to a 
variety of methods.  One common criterion, in keeping with 
the spirit of the Code’s catch-all language in section 
301.1(2), is that conditions be “reasonable.”125  Given the 
 
 122. See, e.g., Douglas Litowitz, The Trouble with “Scarlet Letter” Punishment: 
Subjecting Criminals to Public Shaming Rituals as a Sentencing Alternative Will 
Not Work, 81 Judicature 52 (1997); Courtney Phaedra O’Hara Kelly, Comment, 
The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment 
Challenges to Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 783 (1999); 
Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishments: Yesterday’s Outlawed 
Penalty is Today’s Probation Condition, 36 Clev. St. L. Rev. 613 (1988). 
 123. Best & Birzon, supra note 67, at 811; Richard F. Doyle, Conditions of 
Probation: Their Imposition and Application, 17 Fed. Probation 18 (1953); Hink, 
supra note 102; Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Glasheen, See What Condition Your 
Conditions Are In, 35 Fed. Probation 3 (1971); Harry J. Jaffe, Probation With a 
Flair: A Look at Some Out-of-the-Ordinary Conditions, 43 Fed. Probation 25 
(1979); Louis K. Polonsky, Note, Limitations upon Trial Court Discretion in 
Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 466 (1974); Comment, Another 
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968); Note, Judicial 
Review of Probation Conditions, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 181 (1967).  See also Model 
Penal Code § 301.01, cmt. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) (noting the “abuse that 
sometimes has occurred”). 
 124. See, e.g., Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial 
Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 
57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 75 (2000); Janet W. Steverson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with 
No-Pregnancy and Drug Treatment Probation Conditions, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
295 (1994); Jaimy M. Levine, Comment, “Join the Sierra Club!”: Imposition of 
Ideology as a Condition of Probation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1841 (1994). 
 125. See Cohen, supra note 4, § 7:34 at 7-60.  Another common test asks 
whether the condition bears no relationship to the crime of conviction, relates to 
conduct that is not in itself criminal, and does not reasonably relate to the 
likelihood of future criminal conduct.  See, e.g., People v. Dominquez, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 290, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Shepherd, 554 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 
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dearth of express guidance on purpose, however, this rubric 
has presented obvious difficulties.  In times past, appellate 
courts could draw an inference easily enough, given the 
dominant place of rehabilitation in probation.126  The 
significantly expanded arsenal of probation conditions, 
however, has made judicial efforts at divination far more 
indeterminate and strained.127 
In short, the decisional framework for probation has 
been and certainly remains in a bad state, due initially to 
highly generalized laws, and more recently to the failure of 
laws to keep pace with the profound changes occurring in 
probation.  Forty years after the Code’s publication, it is 
clear that its codification impetus, while of major 
importance to the criminal law more generally,128 has fallen 
short of the mark when it comes to the purposes of 
 
1996); Lacy v. State, 875 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App. 1994).  For other formulations see 
Cohen, supra note 4, §§ 7:34; 7:35. 
 126. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in 1975: 
The theme that rehabilitation underlies probation is mirrored not only in 
the probation systems established under state law, but also in the Model 
Penal Code, which expressly recognizes rehabilitation by authorizing the 
imposition of any conditions of probation “reasonably related to the 
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or 
incompatible with his freedom of conscience.” 
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1975).  See also 
Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980) (deeming punishment 
an impermissible purpose of probation). 
It bears mention that other courts, however, were not so willing to ascribe a 
singular purpose, which afforded greater latitude in the review of the 
reasonableness of conditions.  As noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
“Probation assumes the offender can be rehabilitated without serving the 
suspended jail sentence.  But this is not to say that probation is meant to be 
painless.  Probation has an inherent sting, and restrictions placed on the freedom 
of the probationer are realistically punitive in quality.”  In re Buehrer, 236 A.2d 
592, 596 (N.J. 1967).  See also State v. Fuentes, 549 P.2d 224 (Az. Ct. App. 1976); 
Bienz v. State. 343 So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Stare v. Labure, 427 So. 
2d 855 (La. 1983).  For more on the abiding uncertainty over the meaning of the 
penological purposes in the context of conditions see infra notes 179-204 and 
accompanying text. 
 127. See, e.g., Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 
1107 (Fla. 1980) (deeming prison term imposed as probation condition a 
“rehabilitative device” because it might deter future criminal activity); Nuckoles 
v. Comm., 407 S.E.2d 355 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding similarly). 
 128. See Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its 
Processes: Cases and Materials 894 (7th ed. 2001) (noting same). 
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probation.  With the coming revision, it is imperative that 
drafters heed the place of purpose in probation.  The next 
section examines why doing so is important and the role 
that purpose can and should play in probation decision 
making. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PURPOSE 
Since at least 1968, with the publication of Henry 
Hart’s Punishment and Responsibility, it has been thought 
useful to distinguish the “general justifying aims” of 
punishment from its “distribution.”129  Professor Hart 
encapsulated the former with the query “What justifies the 
general practice of punishment?”; the latter combined two 
essential questions: “To whom may punishment be 
applied?” and “How severely may we punish?”130  More 
recently, Michael Smith has refined this important 
distinction, drawing attention to the distinction between 
purposes “at sentencing” and purposes “of sentencing.”131  
Bearing in mind these important distinctions, this section 
examines the importance of articulated purpose with 
respect to the threshold question of whether probation 
should be imposed in the first instance on a statutorily 
eligible offender, and second, if imposed, the decision to 
assign particular conditions.132 
 
 129. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of 
the Law 3-13 (1968). 
 130. Id. at 3. 
 131. Michael E. Smith, Designing and Implementing Noncustodial Penal 
Sanctions: What Purposes Will Real Alternatives Serve?, 4 Fed. Sent. Rep. 27, 27 
n.1 (1991).  According to Professor Smith: 
The latter (retribution or desert, incapacitation, general deterrence, specific 
deterrence, and rehabilitation) may be an exhaustive list of permissible 
purposes for the state’s imposition of penal measures.  The former is the 
objective that is sought—or might permissibly be sought—by the state at 
the point in a criminal prosecution when guilt has been established and the 
judiciary is poised to exercise state power. 
Id. 
 132. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 1:5 n.1 (noting that “[t]he theoretical bases for 
granting probation must be distinguished from the bases for assigning probation 
conditions”). 
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A. The Importance of Purpose in Choosing Prison or 
Probation 
Due in significant part to the Code, penal theory has 
come to play a central role in criminal justice policy 
discourse.  Before 1962, state penal codes were largely 
devoid of statutory statements of purpose and courts 
opined on purpose only to a limited extent.133  Since then, it 
has become commonplace for legislatures to speak directly 
to penal purpose in laws,134 and purpose has become a 
staple in judicial pronouncements, including those of the 
Supreme Court.135 
The benefits of explicit articulation of sentencing 
purpose are considerable.  First, simply as a matter of 
social contract, the deprivation of liberty associated with 
criminal sentences warrants some articulation of purpose 
by government.  Relatedly, express statements of purpose 
lend transparency, which can instill confidence that the 
government is engaged in straight-dealing and encourage 
system actors to be more open and visible in their exercise 
of discretion.  Finally, articulation of purpose allows trial 
and appellate courts to critically evaluate the “fit” between 
avowed objectives of punishment and their achievement, 
 
 133. See Cotton, supra note 76, at 1313 & 1318-19.  As noted in the Code 
Commentary, “[a] statement of objectives has been rare in American penal codes 
and when attempted far too general to be of service.”  Model Penal Code § 102 
cmt. at 5 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954). 
 134. Professor Cotton observes that while no state adopted the Code’s 
particular verbiage on purposes, contained in section 1.02(2), about half of the 
states 
adopted a statutory statement of purpose based on, inspired by, or 
provoked by that in the [Code].  No state adopted the [Code’s] particular 
wording on purposes, but about a dozen of those that did adopt some 
statement of purposes adopted one reflecting the utilitarian, nonretributive 
perspective of the Code, specifying the purposes of punishment as 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation, and omitting retribution. 
Cotton, supra note 76, at 1319. 
 135. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1187-88 (2003) (noting 
Court’s willingness to defer to penological justifications of state criminal justice 
initiatives); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (noting that if the death 
penalty is to be constitutional it must have “penological justification,” and 
identifying retribution and deterrence as the sanction’s core justifications). 
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leading ideally to what has been called a “common law of 
purposes.”136 
Efforts directed at the codification of purpose, however, 
have been criticized by some.  George Fletcher, for 
instance, has suggested that “[p]hilosophical truths are . . . 
beyond the competence of the legislature.  There is 
something ridiculous about a legislature intermeddling in a 
philosophical dispute—say, by deciding whether Immanuel 
Kant’s moral theory is superior to Jeremy Bentham’s.”137  
Qualified or not, it is unavoidably the job of government to 
articulate rationales for the application of its penal laws.  
Responsible democratic governance demands that purposes 
be identified and that these purposes be delineated with 
sufficient clarity to guide decision making.  Without self-
critical examination, as Markus Dubber has rightly 
observed, “American penal law will continue its drift into 
an unreflected acting out of self-protective impulses.”138 
Although a difficult endeavor, fraught with major 
political ramifications, purpose must nonetheless be 
 
 136. Miller, supra note 5, at 478. Cf. Norval Morris, Toward Principled 
Sentencing, 37 Md. L. Rev. 267, 284 (1977) (urging appellate review of sentences 
in order to develop a “common law of sentencing”).  An illustration of this 
important self-critical undertaking was provided by Judge Marvin Frankel almost 
thirty years ago.  If required to articulate why rehabilitative purpose would be 
served in a particular instance a judge would be forced to reflect upon the very 
essence and practical effect of purpose: 
Compelled to focus on what he thinks he means by rehabilitation, the 
sentencer should be better able to know whether he really means it at all.  
He should be able to see with some clarity whether and why the sentence 
should be indeterminate.  He should be moved to ask insistently where the 
defendant will be taken from the courtroom, what will be done for him, and 
why that course is thought to present realistic prospects of rehabilitation. 
Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 111 (1973).  See also 
id. at 108 (asserting that legislative specification of permissible sentencing 
objectives, in tandem with the requirement that judges specify which objectives 
are appropriate in individual cases, “would compel the judge to think connectedly 
about his reasons and to justify explicitly decisions now taken on unarticulated 
hunches”). 
 137. George Fletcher, Truth in Codification, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 745, 745-46 
(1998). 
 138. Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Penal Code, 
4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 100 (2000). 
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stated.139  While from the perspective of offenders the choice 
between imprisonment and community-based dispositions 
is no longer a zero-sum question, guidance on the threshold 
disposition question of whether imprisonment is warranted 
is needed.  And such guidance must be as clear-eyed as is 
possible.  As Norval Morris has written with respect to 
imprisonment in particular, “[t]here is a sharp distinction 
between the purposes of incarceration and the 
opportunities for the training and assistance of prisoners 
that may be pursued within those purposes.  The system is 
corrupted when we fail to perceive this distinction and this 
failure pervades the world’s prison programs.”140 
Almost as a rule, however, the law fails to afford 
purpose-based guidance to facilitate the decision.  The Code 
itself refuses to “state a fixed priority” among the means to 
secure its amorphous crime prevention goals, instead 
urging “the just harmonizing” of objectives.141  Current law 
in most U.S. jurisdictions is a direct intellectual descendent 
of this approach.  However, federal statutory law, 18 U.S.C. 
sec. 3553(a), and related parts of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, illustrate how a purpose-based framework, one 
not necessarily seeking harmony, might be formulated.  
Section 3553(a) provides that the court, in addition to 
considering relevant offense and defendant-related factors, 
shall consider: 
 
 139. Purpose, of course, can emanate from legislative bodies or agencies 
designated to fulfill the responsibility.  There is much to be said in favor of the 
view, as the ABA notes in its most recent Standards, that “such foundational 
decisions should be made by a democratically chosen and politically accountable 
organ of government.”  American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice Sentencing  stnd. 18-2.1 cmt. at 15 (3d ed. 1994).  Indeed, the abdication 
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in carrying out its statutory mandate in this 
regard, see infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text, lends support to this 
position.  This Article takes no position on the question of which body is best 
suited to perform the important task, only that purpose be delineated.  As 
Professor Cotton illustrates in her survey of case law over the past forty years, in 
the absence of express guidance on purpose (and even at times in its presence), 
courts engage in an unaccountable, highly idiosyncratic and result-driven 
analysis, usually in favor of retributive rationales.  See Cotton, supra note 76, at 
1324-57. 
 140. Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 14 (1974). 
 141. Model Penal Code Tentative Draft No. 2, § 1.02 cmt. at 4 (May 3, 1954). 
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(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner. . . .142 
As pointed out by others, Congress, rather than 
expecting that all four enumerated purposes be served in 
each offender’s case,143 expected that judges would be 
directed to critically evaluate the place of each purpose in 
individual cases.144  For instance, although Congress 
explicitly ruled out rehabilitation as a purpose supporting a 
decision to imprison,145 the Senate Report accompanying 
 
 142. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2002). 
 143. Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in 
the Federal Courts 53 (1998); Miller, supra note 5, at 438-39. 
 144. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 77 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3183, 3260: 
In setting out the four purposes of sentencing, the Committee has 
deliberately not shown a preference for one purpose of sentencing over 
another, in the belief that different purposes may play greater or lesser 
roles in sentencing different types of offenses committed by different types 
of defendants.  The Committee recognizes that a particular purpose of 
sentencing may play no role in a particular case.  The intent of subsection 
(a)(2) is to recognize the four purposes that sentencing in general is 
designed to achieve, and to require that the judge consider what impact, if 
any, each particular purpose should have on the sentence in each case. 
See also id. at 59, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3242 (“the bill sets forth the four basic 
purposes of criminal sanctions. It requires the Sentencing Commission to consider 
these purposes in developing sentencing guidelines and policy statements.  It 
further requires sentencing judges to consider them in imposing sentences.”). 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2002).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2002) (instructing 
Sentencing Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the 
inappropriateness of . . . imprisonment for the purposes of rehabilitating the 
defendant . . . .”).  This is not to say, however, that persons imprisoned for another 
purpose(s) would not be provided with rehabilitative services.  See S. Rep. No. 98-
225, supra note 144, at 76, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3259 (stating that 
“[p]rograms within the prison setting should be available and encouraged to 
enhance the possibility of rehabilitation”).  For an attempted rebuttal of the view 
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the Act is at pains to state that rehabilitative purpose 
should be weighed “in determining whether a sanction 
other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a 
particular case.”146  In discussing the relationship between 
probation and purposes, for instance, the Report 
acknowledged that: 
[t]he placing on probation of an embezzler, a confidence 
man, a corrupt politician, a businessman who has 
repeatedly violated regulatory laws, an operator of a 
pyramid sales scheme, or a tax violator, may be perfectly 
appropriate in cases in which, under all the circumstances, 
only the rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; 
such a sentence may be grossly inappropriate, however, in 
cases in which the circumstances mandate the sentence’s 
carrying substantial deterrent or punitive impact.147 
The Guidelines themselves, however, are silent on 
rehabilitation, providing only that “[p]robation may be used 
as an alternative to incarceration” if conditions imposed 
“promot[e] respect for the law, provid[e] just punishment 
for the offense, achiev[e] general deterrence, and protect[] 
the public from further crimes by the defendant.”148 
While much of the purpose-based critical commentary 
directed at the Commission has concerned its failure to 
articulate a coherent sentencing rationale,149 more 
 
that the central purpose of prison is not rehabilitative, see Edward L. Rubin, The 
Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 Law & Ineq. 343, 364 (2001).  For an extended 
defense of rehabilitation more generally, see Edgardo Rotman, Beyond 
Punishment: A New View on the Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders (1990). 
 146. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, supra note 144, at 76-77, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3273.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (specifying that “in determining the 
particular sentence to be imposed” the court “shall consider” inter alia “the need 
for the sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner”). 
 147. S. Rep. No. 98-225, supra note 144, at 92, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3275.  See 
also id. at 76 (stating that “[r]ehabilitation is a particularly important 
consideration in formulating conditions for persons placed on probation . . .”).  For 
examples of other federal statutes that specifically direct courts to consider 
sanctions in light of purposes see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562, 3563, 3584(b). 
 148. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ch. 5, pt. B, intro. cmt. 
 149. See¸ e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They 
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significant to the discussion here is the Commission’s 
presumption that only two purposes (“crime control” and 
“just deserts”) exhausted the permissible purposes of 
punishment, and that as a “practical matter” the competing 
aims lead to the “same result.”150  As discussed earlier, 
while such a sentiment might be accurate if the sole 
sentencing option available to a court is imprisonment, it is 
of little help when it comes to deciding between prison and 
the numerous non-incarcerative sanctions.151 
The Commission’s disappointing failure to incorporate 
Congressional directive should not obscure the significance 
of section 3553, however.  It, and the accompanying Senate 
Report, provide a useful template for the incorporation of 
purpose into threshold sentencing decisions.  Again, the 
point is not that all purposes must be served in each case.  
As Michael Tonry has accurately observed, multipurpose 
sentencing systems are difficult to operationalize.152  They 
fail, as he states, to provide any “guidance whatever in 
sentencing particular cases.”153  When making the 
 
Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 367, 370-73 (1989). 
 150. The Commission, feeling that it had to choose between competing “crime 
control” and “just deserts” approaches, ultimately demurred: 
[a] philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile 
the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.  Most 
observers of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, 
and of punishment in particular, is the control of crime.  Beyond this point, 
however, the consensus seems to break down. . . .  A clear-cut Commission 
decision in favor of one of these approaches would diminish the chance that 
the guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they need for effective 
implementation.  As a practical matter, in most sentencing decisions both 
philosophies may prove consistent with the same result. 
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements 1.3-1.4 
(Apr. 13, 1987), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046-138 (May 13, 1987). 
 151. Ultimately, however, these concerns proved to be of little practical trouble 
to the Commission because the guidelines contain presumptive prison terms for 
all offenders and impose substantial limits on the capacity of sentencing courts to 
impose non-prison sanctions.  See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1997 Sourcebook 
of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl. 12 (1998). 
 152. Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines, 23 
Crime & Just. 199, 242 (1998) (“Most modern sentencing systems purport to be 
multipurpose, but it has proven difficult to give operational meaning to that 
idea.”) [hereinafter Tonry, Intermediate]. 
 153. Id. 
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threshold disposition decision, courts might instead be 
guided by a “series of presumptions about purposes 
relevant to individual cases.”154  “Any sentence inconsistent 
with the presumption would be a departure and require 
provision of reasons that could be reviewed on appeal.”155 
Although its progression has been regrettably stunted, 
the federal system has, nonetheless, shown some capacity 
to incorporate purpose in the prison/non-prison 
determination.  Because federal law excludes rehabilitation 
as a reason to commit offenders to prison,156 when courts 
wish to depart from presumptive prison terms contained in 
the guidelines, they have shown a willingness to cite 
rehabilitation as a purpose justifying departure.157  This 
nascent case law, developing amid guidelines clearly not 
predisposed to such explicitness, affords hope that such a 
system can be effectuated. 
Also holding promise is the approach of Pennsylvania, 
which has adopted a “layered” approach to its presumptive, 
guidelines-based system.  Pennsylvania courts are directed to 
consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, 
and may impose them consecutively or concurrently: 
(1) An order of probation. 
(2) A determination of guilt without further penalty. 
(3) Partial confinement. 
(4) Total confinement. 
(5) A fine. 
(6) Intermediate punishment.158 
When imposing a term of imprisonment, sentencing courts 
are guided by the “general principle” that “the sentence 
imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with 
the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 
 
 154. Id. at 243. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Richard S. Frase, Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probation 
as a Basis for Departure under the Minnesota and Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 3 Fed. Sent. Rep. 328 (1991) (discussing decisions). 
 158. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9721(a) (2003). 
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relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 
community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant.”159 
As a crucial complement to this broad prescription, 
Pennsylvania’s guidelines entail five sentencing levels, 
providing a sentencing regime with an avowed “primary 
focus on retribution, but one in which the recommendations 
allow for the fulfillment of other sentencing purposes 
including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.”160  
The five levels are arrayed in terms of increasing severity 
of offense and offender criminal histories, with each level 
tied to the purposes the sentencing commission seeks to 
achieve and the sanctions thought most appropriate to 
those ends.  Level I, for instance, has as its primary 
purpose “the minimal control necessary to fulfill court-
ordered options,” and allows that only “Restorative 
Sanctions” be imposed.161  On the other extreme, Level 5 
seeks “punishment commensurate with the seriousness of 
the criminal behavior and incapacitation to protect the 
public,” and requires incarceration in a state facility, 
possibly with added participation in a “Motivational Boot 
Camp.” 162 
In sum, criminal justice need not, in the words of 
Professors Zimring and Hawkins, be driven by 
“unexamined principles.”163  Sentencing purposes are surely 
capable of being prescribed by governments, and such 
purposes can and must influence decision making on 
threshold sentencing outcomes. 
 
 159. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9721(b). 
 160. Pa. Sent. Guideline § 303.11(1), Pa. Code tit. 204, ch. 303, § 303.11 (2003).  
Furthermore, all sentences must be accompanied by a statement of the reason(s) 
justifying their imposition and, in the event the recommended guideline sentence 
is deviated from, the reason(s) therefor.  Id.  The law further provides that failure 
to “comply shall be grounds for vacating the sentence and resentencing the 
defendant.”  Id. 
 161. Id. § 303.11(b)(1). 
 162. Id. § 303.11(b)(5). 
 163. Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Incapacitation: Penal Confinement 
and the Restraint of Crime 3 (1995). 
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B. The Importance of Purpose in Imposing Probation 
Conditions 
Purpose is surely no less important when it comes to 
the question of what conditions might be imposed upon an 
individual granted probation.  As the Code itself 
acknowledged, specification of purpose in the application of 
particular probation conditions is much more “difficult” than 
the “stark” prison versus non-prison decision.164  If difficult 
in 1962, the task can only be thought of as considerably 
more so today in light of the diversified range of conditions 
and purposes characteristic of modern probation. 
This indeterminacy perhaps in part explains, but does 
not justify, the absence of purpose in current laws 
governing the imposition of probation conditions.165  With 
legislatures showing little capacity (or desire) for 
cognizance of purposes at sentencing, the discussion here 
will focus largely upon other sources.  The Minnesota 
Sentencing Commission has taken some preliminary steps 
in this direction.  Although it refrained from developing 
guidelines for the imposition of non-incarcerative 
conditions, and urges only that conditions be “permitted by 
law” and “appropriate,”166 the Commission acknowledges 
that: 
there are several penal objectives to be considered in 
establishing conditions of stayed sentences, including but 
not limited to, retribution, rehabilitation, public protection, 
restitution, deterrence, and public condemnation of criminal 
conduct.  The Commission also recognizes that the relative 
importance of these objectives may vary with both the 
 
 164. Model Penal Code § 7.01 cmt. at 223 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). 
 165. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.  An equally plausible 
explanation is that, as with so much in criminal justice administration, the 
system has simply proceeded in an unreflective way, as it has in enacting 
criminal laws, without any semblance of coherence or self-reflection.  See 
generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 505, 512-19 (2001). 
 166. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines § III.A.201 cmt. at 44 (2003). 
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offense and offender characteristics and that multiple 
objectives may be present in any given sentence.167 
Accordingly, if “principled standards” for establishing 
conditions are to drive sentencing, the Commission 
reasons, sentencing courts must “first consider the 
objectives served by a stayed sentence and, second, 
consider the resources available to achieve those 
objectives.”168  The Commission provides the following basic 
considerations to guide courts: 
When retribution is an important objective of a stayed 
sentence, the severity of the retributive sanction should be 
proportional to the severity of the offense and the prior 
criminal record of the offender, and judges should consider 
the availability and adequacy of local jail or correctional 
facilities in establishing such sentences.  The Commission 
urges judges to utilize the least restrictive conditions of 
stayed sentences that are consistent with the objectives of 
the sanction.  When rehabilitation is an important objective 
of a stayed sentence, judges are urged to make full use of 
programs and resources available to accomplish the 
rehabilitative objectives.  The absence of a rehabilitative 
resource, in general, should not be a basis for more 
extensive use of incarceration than is justified on other 
grounds.169 
While instructive in a very general sense, the 
aforementioned language unfortunately offers scant real 
guidance to courts in drawing distinctions among sanctions 
in terms of penal purpose, as applied to individual offenders. 
Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, in their influential 
1990 book Between Prison and Probation,170 gamely 
attempted to keep purposes in mind, and provided the 
following scenario to illustrate their position: 
 
 167. Id. III.A.2 Comm. at 43. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Morris & Tonry, supra note 98, at 177-79. 
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If, for example, the sole or primary purpose at sentencing is 
retribution, an appropriately severe package of financial 
sanctions, including restitution, costs, and a substantial 
quantum of day fines, may suffice.  If the purposes at 
sentencing include both desert and control, depending on 
the offender’s circumstances, a combination of community 
service, home detention, mandatory drug treatment and 
testing, and intensive probation supervision might be 
enough.  In still other cases, responding to public sentiment 
or deterrent or incapacitative concerns may be the 
governing purposes at sentencing; if so, the principle of 
rough equivalence permits imposition of a not-undeserved 
incarcerative sentence. . . .171 
In an effort to lend some practicality to their task, Professors 
Tonry and Morris assigned purpose to particular non-
incarcerative sanctions.  Conceiving of all punishments as 
“reductions in autonomy,” the authors surveyed a variety of 
options.  House arrest, for instance, has as its primary 
purposes incapacitation and training for conformity; 
community service, deterrence and training for conformity; and 
intermittent imprisonment, deterrence and incapacitation.172 
While helpful as a starting point, the framework has 
several shortcomings.  First, because it was developed over 
a decade ago, it fails to examine several recent non-
incarcerative sanctions, including boot camps and shame 
sanctions.173  More important, the framework gives short 
shrift to retributive/just deserts considerations in the 
imposition of non-incarcerative sanctions.174 
In 1998, Professor Tonry again ventured to set forth a 
few examples of how a purpose-based sentencing scheme 
might look in application, offering a few scenarios: 
 
 171. Id. at 90-91.  The authors’ reference to “equivalence” relates to their 
extended treatment, earlier in the book, of “interchangeable punishments,” based 
on their admittedly “subjective and arbitrary” correlation of non-incarcerative 
sanctions with prison time.  See id. at 75-81. 
 172. Id. at 177-79. 
 173. Id. at 178. 
 174. See id. at 177 (disavowing “concern[] with retributive considerations and 
the limits they impose on the appropriateness of particular sentences in 
individual cases”). 
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1. For a drug-dependent shoplifter or burglar or a drug 
dealer, prevention of future crimes and rehabilitation 
might be the most important purposes at sentencing; 
compulsory drug treatment . . . might be the optimal 
primary sentence with restitution or community 
service as an adjunct. 
2. For a bank-teller embezzler, retribution and general 
deterrence may be predominant purposes at 
sentencing, and restitution and community service or a 
fine the optimal sentences. 
3. For the perpetrator of a commercial fraud, retribution 
and general deterrence may be the predominant 
purposes and restitution, stigmatizing community 
service, and a very substantial fine the optimal 
sentence. 
4. For an employed blue-collar head of family who has 
committed a serious assault while intoxicated, 
retribution and deterrence may be the predominant 
purposes and a substantial fine and nighttime and 
weekend confinement the optimal sentence, thereby 
permitting him to continue to work and support his 
family. 
5. For a third-time street mugger, deterrence and 
incapacitation may be the predominant purposes, and 
a short period of confinement followed by intensive 
supervision the optimal sentence.175 
While certainly more helpful, given its more complete 
incorporation of penal purposes, the foregoing still falls 
short of the mark because it fails to acknowledge the basic 
definitional uncertainties of penal purposes themselves.  
Again, when the only available option is prison, the 
notoriously indistinct quality of the respective purposes, 
and their common interrelatedness, matter little.  With 
non-incarcerative sanctions, as Professor Tonry himself 
acknowledges, “[f]undamental normative questions must be 
faced and resolved if meaningful policies are to be set.”176 
 
 175. Tonry, Intermediate, supra note 152, at 247-48. 
 176. Id. at 205.  For a more expansive charting of non-incarcerative options, 
albeit without express links to purpose, see Alan T. Harland, Defining a 
Continuum of Sanctions: Some Research and Policy Development Implications, in 
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Unfortunately, much of the intellectual energy that 
could have been dedicated to this normative work has been 
directed at conceiving of a translation rubric based on 
retributive and just desert principles to enable non-
incarcerative sanctions to be imposed with some semblance 
of metric relation to prison terms.  While perhaps helpful in 
promoting the use of non-incarcerative sanctions, inasmuch 
as it has made them more politically palatable, the effort has 
ultimately shed very little light on the penal purposes that 
might guide imposition of such sanctions, other than those 
sounding in retribution/desert.177  The crucial question that 
remains unaddressed is not “how much” but “why,” the key 
inquiry if an informed decision on “what” sanction is to be 
imposed.178 
However, if consensus is to be reached on this front 
progress will have to be made on some definitional matters 
of foundational importance.  Deontological theories, such as 
retribution and just deserts, pose difficulties for purpose 
analysis.  This is because they largely focus on culpability 
and hence of necessity rely mainly upon subjective 
assessments of displeasure associated with particular 
sanctions.  Informative work has been done on the 
perceived effects of non-incarcerative sanctions, compared 
to one another and not prison, which will be instrumental 
 
The Intermediate Sanction Handbook: Experiences and Tools for Policymakers 
35, 38 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1993) [hereinafter Handbook]; Alan T. Harland, 
Correctional Options That Work: Structuring the Inquiry in Choosing 
Correctional Options That Work: Defining the Demand and Evaluating the 
Supply 1, 6-7 tbl. 1.1 (Alan T. Harland ed., 1996). 
 177. Upon assessing the correlation difficulty Professor Tonry concludes that 
[b]luntly put, retributive and just desert theories allow little room for use of 
intermediate sanctions.  Proportionality concerns require that punishment 
severity be scaled to the seriousness of crimes, which means the metric is 
some measure of painfulness or intrusiveness, and offenders convicted of 
comparably serious crimes must receive comparably serious punishment.  
Few punishments are as intrusive or burdensome as imprisonment . . . . 
Tonry, Intermediate, supra note 152, at 206. 
 178. For an extended treatment of the importance of articulating purpose-
related goals in the intermediate sanctions realm in particular see Peggy 
McGarry, Agreeing on Goals: The Heart of the Process and Developing a Common 
Frame of Reference, in Handbook, supra note 176, at 59, 71. 
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in the definitional task.179  Teleological theories, such as 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation, by contrast, 
largely turn on results; they are consequential in nature 
and goal-oriented.180  They are hence more susceptible of 
empirical evaluation, and future research can be brought to 
bear by policymakers in clarifying the purposes served by 
particular sanctions. 
Moreover, there remains the enduring difficulty 
alluded to above of drawing meaningful distinctions among 
the various penal purposes themselves.  Perhaps foremost 
among the blurred meanings is that of rehabilitation, 
historically a core purpose of probation.181  From the origins 
of the Republic, harsh sanctions with unabashed deterrent 
and punitive qualities were rationalized on the basis of 
their supposed rehabilitative effects on offenders.182  The 
penitentiary, of course, was largely motivated by this 
optimistic premise183 and the Model Penal Code itself 
 
 179. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch et al., Punishments in the Community and 
the Principles of Desert, 20 Rutgers L.J. 595 (1989); Robert E. Harlow et al., The 
Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychosocial Scaling Approach for 
Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. Quant. Criminology 71 (1995); Sue Rex 
& Andrew von Hirsch, Community Orders and the Assessment of Punishment 
Severity, 10 Fed. Sent. Rep. 278 (1998).  For a ranking of perceived severity from 
the perspective of actual inmates see Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper 
Deschenes, What Punishes? Inmates Rank the Severity of Prison vs. Intermediate 
Sanctions, in Contemporary Community Corrections 240 (Thomas Ellsworth ed., 
2d ed. 1996).  The effort could also possibly benefit from methodology used to 
plumb sentiments among the general public on the deservedness of criminal 
penalties for particular offenders and offenses.  See generally Paul H. Robinson & 
John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the 
Criminal Law (1995); Peter H. Rossi et al., Just Punishment: Federal Guidelines 
and Public Views Compared (1997); Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of 
Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and 
Democracy, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 635 (2000). 
 180. See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in The Handbook of 
Crime & Punishment 659-82 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
 181. Rehabilitation, in the words of one author, “is probably the most 
overworked word in the correctional lexicon.  It is also the least understood and 
the most misused.”  Louis P. Carney, Probation and Parole: Legal and Social 
Dimensions 85 (1977). 
 182. See Gerald Austin McHugh, Christian Faith and Criminal Justice 39-41 
(1978). 
 183. See generally David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 
1789-1865, in The Oxford History of the Prison 100 (Norval Morris & David J. 
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attests to the dominant view (at least until the 1970s) that 
prisons rehabilitate.184  Hard labor, equally, was extolled as 
a rehabilitative tool.185  More generally, as observed by 
Herbert Packer, the threat of punishment in itself can be 
justified by rehabilitative purpose.186 
The abiding confusion over purpose is illustrated in 
recent appellate decisions on shame sanctions.  In Ballenger 
v. State,187 for instance, a probationer was required to wear a 
fluorescent pink bracelet inscribed with the words “DUI 
CONVICT.”  Noting the broad authority of sentencing courts 
to impose conditions, the Georgia Court Appeals upheld the 
condition, concluding that it served the statutory goals of 
rehabilitation and community protection.188  “Being jurists 
rather than psychologists, we cannot say that the 
stigmatizing effect of wearing the bracelet may not have a 
rehabilitative, deterrent effect.”189  Similarly, in Lindsay v. 
State,190 the Florida District Court of Appeal held that 
requiring a probationer to place in his local paper a mugshot 
with the caption “DUI-CONVICTED” was rehabilitative.  A 
 
Rothman eds., 1995). 
 184. Model Penal Code § 7.01 & cmt. (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
 185. Rothman, supra note 183, at 106-10.  Cf. Decision of the State Council 
Regarding the Question of Rehabilitation Through Labour (approved at the 78th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress [China] on 
Aug. 1, 1957), rpt. in Nicholas N. Kittrie et al., Sentencing, Sanctions, and 
Corrections: Federal and State Law, Policy, and Practice 11 (2d ed. 2002)) 
(persons “shall be interned for rehabilitation through labour”). 
 186. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 56 (1968) (noting 
that “the threat of punishment for future offenses as extrapolated from the 
experience of suffering the punishment for a present offense may be the strongest 
rehabilitative force that we now possess”).  For an effort to distinguish “reform” 
from “rehabilitation” see Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence 72 
(1979) (asserting that rehabilitation seeks to alter behavior by “non-punitive 
means”; reform seeks alteration through punishment).  Despite this overlap, 
deontology and teleology have been characterized as incapable of principled 
coexistence.  See Larry Alexander, Deontology at a Threshold, 37 San Diego L. 
Rev. 893, 908 (2000).  Indeed, Professor Packer himself acknowledges that 
deterrence and retribution “are almost universally though of as being 
incompatible.”  Packer, supra, at 36. 
 187. 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
 188. Id. at 794. 
 189. Id. at 794-95. 
 190. 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
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few years before, the same court held that the avowed 
rehabilitative purpose behind requiring that a probationer 
affix a DUI bumper sticker was not “utterly without 
foundation.”191 
On the other hand, in People v. Letterlough,192 the New 
York Court of Appeals overturned a condition requiring 
that an individual convicted of drunk driving affix to his 
car a fluorescent sticker reading “CONVICTED DWI.”193  
The Letterlough Court, while noting the “inherent overlap 
and the difficulty in drawing lines between rehabilitative 
and punitive or deterrent sanctions,”194 nonetheless found 
the condition punitive and hence contrary to the avowed 
statutory goal of rehabilitation.195  To the Court, separation 
of powers concerns compelled deference to legislative 
judgment, despite the overlap.196  One year later, in People 
v. McNair,197 the same Court invalidated a condition 
involving electronic monitoring, reasoning that the 
condition was motivated by “public safety and surveillance, 
not rehabilitation.”198 
The problem has also been evidenced in the review of 
various monetary-related conditions.  For instance, victim 
restitution, a staple probation condition with the advent of 
 
 191. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).  See 
also, e.g., State v. Bateman, 765 P.2d 249 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
rehabilitative value in sign reading “Dangerous Sex Offender—No Children 
Allowed”). 
 192. 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1985). 
 193. Id. at 147. 
 194. Id. at 149. 
 195. Id. at 150. 
 196. Id.  See also id. (probation conditions require “state-wide uniformity and 
the kind of policy choices that only an elected Legislature can make.”). 
 197. 665 N.E.2d 167, 168 (N.Y. 1996). 
 198. Id. at 169. The Supreme Courts of Illinois and Tennessee, construing their 
similar probation statutes, have held similarly.  See People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 
315, 320 (Ill. 1997); State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 86-87 (Tenn. 1996). 
In response to McNair and Letterlough, the New York Legislature amended 
the State’s probation law.  Unfortunately, its new language was strikingly 
ambiguous and unhelpful as to purpose: courts can impose any “reasonable 
condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to 
ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the 
incarceration of the defendant.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 65.10(5) (McKinney 1997). 
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the victims’ rights movement,199 and backed by the Code,200 
has required courts to awkwardly justify such orders in 
terms of rehabilitation and public protection,201 despite the 
meager evidence supporting such rationales.202  Similarly, 
the standard probation condition requiring payment of 
funds to support dependents has uncertain rehabilitative 
outcomes, especially for offenders not convicted of support-
related crimes.203  Fines, yet another common condition, 
have been justified on the basis of rehabilitative purpose, 
despite the distinct possibility that the increased financial 
pressures they carry might have just the opposite effect.204 
The foregoing examples highlight the difficulty of 
drawing meaningful jurisprudential distinctions, and 
achieving consensus, among probation purposes at 
sentencing.205  Unfortunately, as yet there are few 
jurisprudential tools available to inform the analysis.  One 
option might lie in case law concerning whether a sanction 
amounts to punishment sufficient to trigger constitutional 
protection, which also largely turns on purpose.  However, 
as recent decisions from the Supreme Court have made 
abundantly clear this body of law is in a very muddled state 
and unfortunately does not hold much promise to help.206 
 
 199. See generally Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the 
Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 333 (1994). 
 200. Model Penal Code § 301.1(2)(h) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 201. See Cohen, supra note 4, § 11:2, at 11-7 to 11-8 (citing and discussing 
cases). 
 202. See Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: 
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 52, 121 (1982) 
(observing that there are “very few specific indications of the theory underlying 
such hopes or ‘findings’ that restitution is either correctional or of benefit to the 
defendant”).  See also G. Fredrick Allen, Fines and Restitution Orders: 
Probationers’ Perspectives, 58 Fed. Probation 34, 35-36 (1994) (noting that over 
two-thirds of probationers surveyed in sample viewed their fines and restitution 
orders as being imposed for punitive reasons). 
 203. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 12:2, at 12-2 to 12-3; 12:5, at 12-7. 
 204. Id. § 12:8, at 12-27 to 12-28. 
 205. Reported case law on the use of banishment as a probation condition is 
similarly divided, with at least one court citing its purported rehabilitative 
benefits.  See State v. Nienhardt, 537 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 206. For a discussion of the muddle with particular regard to the application of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, see Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the 
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An alternative might lie in case law addressing the 
award of prison or jail “credit” for time served.  There a rich 
body of case law has developed requiring courts to critically 
examine the nature of particular sanctions.  The Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines, for instance, expressly preclude 
credit for time spent in “residential treatment facilities.”207  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently interpreted this 
provision in a case involving a juvenile probationer who 
faced revocation after having spent time in a private 
residential treatment facility (“The Colorado Boys Ranch”).  
The Court observed that “residential treatment programs, 
although involving a restriction of liberty and commonly a 
condition of probation, are not punishment for the offense 
committed, but are an alternative to punishment.”208  In 
answering whether the placement amounted to custody, 
and hence warranted credit, the court distinguished the 
facility from the State’s juvenile correctional facility (“Red 
Wing Correctional Facility”), finding the two facilities 
“qualitatively different”: 
[Red Wing] serves “serious and chronic juvenile offenders.”  
[The Boys Ranch] “admits youth, ages 12 through 18, with 
severe emotional and behavioral problems.” Red Wing 
 
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1261 (1998).  For a time it 
appeared that such a “purposive approach” might get traction, however.  In the 
Court’s 5-4 decision in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which held that 
the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the corporal punishment of public 
schoolchildren, the dissent argued strenuously in its favor.  Writing for himself, 
and Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, Justice White argued: 
The relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment is 
inflicted has been labeled as criminal, but whether the purpose of the 
deprivation is among those ordinarily associated with punishment, such as 
retribution, rehabilitation or deterrence . . . . 
If this purposive approach were followed in the present case, it would be 
clear that spanking in the Florida public schools is punishment within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 687-88 (White, J., dissenting).  See also Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 
893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (urging a two-step analysis: “[f]irst, we consider the 
purposes for which the judge imposed the conditions, the second step is to 
determine whether the conditions are reasonably related to the purposes.”). 
 207. Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 166, III.C.04 cmt. 
 208. State v. Bradley, 629 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
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residents are in the custody of the Commissioner of 
Corrections as punishment related to the community 
without further involvement in the justice system.”  [Boys 
Ranch] residence programs are not punishment, and they 
treat a variety of emotional and psychological problems that 
may or may not include delinquent behavior.209 
Focusing on the different regimes in the respective 
environments, and pinning importance on the “differences 
between facilities that treat and those that punish,” the 
Court held that time in the private residential facility did 
not warrant credit: 
We believe that the more rigid restrictions imposed as 
punishment in state correctional facilities differ 
significantly from the restrictions deemed necessary as part 
of a successful rehabilitation program.  Inmates who, as a 
condition of probation, serve time and receive treatment in 
state correctional facilities are subject to evaluation by state 
officials.  Offenders who receive treatment in a residential 
treatment program may not be similarly restricted, are not 
subject to evaluation by state officials, and, significantly are 
not receiving treatment in conjunction with punishment for 
the offense committed, but instead are receiving treatment 
as an alternative to punishment.210 
Other courts have reasoned to similar results on other 
credit questions, evaluating on a case-by-case basis 
whether particular probation conditions are sufficiently 
onerous to warrant an award.  For example, courts have 
typically deemed electronic home monitoring to qualify211 
 
 209. Id. at 467. 
 210. Id. at 467-68.  See also Asfaha v. State, 665 N.W.2d 523, 528 (Minn. 2003) 
(courts must “look closely at the facts” and assess whether “the level of 
confinement and limitations imposed are the functional equivalent” of 
incarceration). 
 211. See, e.g., People v. Moss, 654 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Comm. v. 
Chiappini, 782 A.2d 490 (Pa. 2001).  According to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, home confinement “is a form of imprisonment, amounting to merely a 
“change in the place where he or she is confined.”  State v. Quattrocchi, 687 A.2d 
78, 79 (R.I. 1996).  But see State v. Wilkinson, 539 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995). 
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but refused credit for involuntary civil commitment212 and 
house arrest.213  Drug or alcohol treatment, if sufficiently 
“jail-like,” can also qualify.214 
If meaningful distinctions are to be drawn, however, 
policymakers must also keep in mind that even facially 
identical non-incarcerative sanctions can differ in kind.  
Just as prisons can differ markedly in their human impact 
on convicts, based on the nature of different institutions, 
non-incarcerative sanctions can vary in their particulars.  
The broad categories belie significant differences, as one 
commentator has noted: 
We hear and speak often about the virtues and deficiencies 
of boot camps, day-treatment centers, community service 
programs, intensive supervision, and so on as if each one 
denoted some self-evident and agreed upon identifying 
characteristic.  The reality, of course, is that some boot 
camps look more like treatment programs than many 
treatment centers, and any two of the other options listed 
are likely to be more different than alike from one 
jurisdiction to another on critical dimensions such as target 
populations, length of participation, and in the richness and 
mix of service or surveillance requirements and resources 
involved. . . .  There are a number of options with particular 
potential for confusion, insofar as their labels appear to 
suggest reliance upon a unitary or at least relatively 
singular sanction and program purpose, whereas the reality 
is that they are much more multifaceted and, therefore, 
much more difficult to categorize and evaluate.215 
 
 212. See, e.g., Closs v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 656 N.W.2d 
314 (S.D. 2003). 
 213. See, e.g., State v. Parks, 6 P.3d 444 (Kan. 2000); State v. Swadley, 526 
N.W.2d 778 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 214. See, e.g., State v. Judson, 45 P.3d 329 (Ak. Ct. App. 2002); Tennell v. 
State, 787 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001). 
 215. Alan T. Harland, Programs vs. Their Component Sanctions, in Handbook, 
supra note 176, at 42.  Professor Harland also notes the diversity of community 
service sanctions, which vary quite markedly in terms of rigor, oversight, and 
physical demands, and might even involve an element of public shaming (e.g., 
picking up roadside trash).  Id. at 43.  See also Madeline M. Carter, Program 
Design, in Handbook, supra note 176, at 113, 118 (noting that “[p]rograms with 
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Despite these complexities, the difficult job of defining 
and distinguishing purposes with regard to particular 
sanctions must at last begin.  It is no longer enough to say, 
as one court did in 1992, that “it is difficult to imagine any 
condition of probation that does not have some punitive 
aspect to it,”216 and leave it at that.  Equally unacceptable 
are broad theoretical suppositions by courts that given 
probation conditions, even those palpably punitive in cast, 
have rehabilitative purpose.217  Rather, despite, indeed 
because of, the reality that a given condition can serve 
more than one purpose, courts in imposing conditions must 
become familiar with their goals and likely effects,218 and 
specify the animating purpose(s) behind their sentencing 
decisions.219  And appellate courts should conduct careful de 
 
similar names and outlines may actually be designed quite differently to achieve 
different goals,” and pointing out such differences as regard to day-reporting 
centers with respective punishment/control and rehabilitative objectives). 
 216. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).  See also, e.g., 
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 267 (holding that conditions that serve to protect 
the public from recidivism or contribute to general deterrence of others are 
consistent with rehabilitation). 
 217. See notes 187-91 and accompanying text.  See also, e.g., State v. Balsam, 
636 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that repayment of extradition costs 
has rehabilitative value). 
 218. This familiarization process in itself is a formidable task.  As Professor 
Harland has noted, “[j]udges and legislators are often woefully unfamiliar with 
the specifics of many of the options available in their own courts and 
communities.”  Harlan, Handbook, supra note 176, at 37.  The difficulty can be 
exacerbated by the localized nature of probation strategies, especially in 
jurisdictions such as North Carolina, where judges rotate among jurisdictions 
within the state.  See North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory 
Commission, Sentencing Practices Under North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing 
Laws 26 (2002) (noting uncertainty among judges), available at 
http://www.nccourts.org/courts. 
 219. As Michael Smith has observed, such clarity of purpose has instrumental 
benefits beyond the initial probationary disposition.  Requiring a probationer to 
obtain and maintain a steady job, for instance, might at once have quasi-
incarcerative effects, inasmuch at it consumes time and energy, and also have 
rehabilitative value.  With violation of the condition, purpose assumes patent 
importance: 
If requiring his participation in the labor market was intended to aid in his 
long-run rehabilitation, the court (or community supervision agent) ought 
to look for some other condition having rehabilitative effect if he has not 
complied with the one initially imposed.  But if the condition was imposed 
to advance a partial incapacitation strategy . . . , violation of the condition 
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novo review of such judgments for consistency with avowed 
statements of purpose.220  Marc Miller has envisioned just 
such a purpose-based sentencing scenario, involving a 
regime in which judges articulate purposes at sentencing, 
and these purposes are assessed by appellate courts, 
mindful of available research on the effects of sanctions: 
Different kinds of sentences will be better or worse at 
achieving different purposes. . . .  Accordingly, a judge 
should evaluate the capacity of sanctions to achieve 
different purposes and then consider whether that sentence 
applies to the particular offender.  The Commission could 
provide guidance by exploring the comparative strengths 
and weaknesses of different sanctions in achieving different 
goals.  Research could be used to bolster or challenge the 
use of different conditions to achieve particular purposes for 
particular groups of offenders.221 
Such an empirical approach, it is important to 
emphasize, is both critically important to the long-term 
viability of probation and lies with the grain of its 
evolution.  Since its Progressive-Era origins, probation has 
been closely linked with social science advances, and its 
 
ought to be met by a more reliably incapacitating condition, which is likely 
to look and feel harsher (and less rehabilitative)—because the need for 
incapacitating conditions in such a sentence is certainly not diminished by 
the offender’s inability to connect with a job and the legitimate income a job 
produces. 
Michael E. Smith, Let Specificity, Clarity, and Parsimony of Purpose Be Our 
Guide, 20 Law & Pol’y 491, 511-12 (1998). 
 220. Historically, meaningful appellate review has been hindered by the 
contentions that probation is an “act of grace” or an arms-length “contract,” which 
have precluded review or limited it to highly deferential abuse of discretion 
analysis.  See Horwitz, supra note 124,  at 84-90.  Also, meaningful review has 
been hindered by the absence of any requirement that sentencing courts specify 
the reasoning behind their decisions.  Cf. State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1279 n.5 
(Conn. 1997) (upholding probation condition of forced charitable donation but 
suggesting that in future cases “express findings supporting the required nexus 
would alleviate any concerns on the part of a reviewing court”). 
 221. Miller, supra note 5, at 470-71. See also Smith, supra note 219, at 495 
(advocating a “rule of law”-based approach to sentencing, whereby courts “reason 
from purpose to sentence, by inferences from the facts and circumstances of each 
case”). 
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discretionary nature has permitted the utilization of 
programmatic innovations.222  Over time, however, this 
empirical orientation diminished and ideologically inspired 
“correctional quackery”223 came to predominate, which, 
rather than seeking to evaluate effectiveness and tailor 
strategies to individual offenders, contented itself with 
supposed panaceas.224  The Code itself, while giving voice to 
the need for “advance[s]” in research,225 failed to take steps 
to meaningfully tie corrections decisions to such research 
and provide a basis for self-critical evaluation. 
Today, after years of malaise and unreflective 
experimentation, empirical work has refuted the pessimistic 
conclusion that “nothing works”;226 certain interventions do 
work and those in the field are increasingly mindful of the 
importance of “evidence-based” correctional strategies.227  
Embedding a sentencing structure that requires careful, 
empirically based judicial consideration of options will play a 
 
 222. Rothman, supra note 22, at 61-68.  See also Sheldon Glueck, The 
Significance and Promise of Probation, in Probation and Criminal Justice: Essays 
in Honor of Herbert C. Parsons, supra note 31, at 18 (asserting that a “research 
unit in every large probation office is as necessary as an endocrine system in the 
human body.”). 
 223. Edward J. Latessa et al., Beyond Correctional Quackery—Professionalism 
and the Possibility of Effective Treatment, 66 Fed. Probation 43 (2002).  Cf. D.A. 
Andrews & J. Stephen Wormith, Personality and Crime: Knowledge Destruction 
and Construction in Criminology, 6 Just. Qtly. 289 (1989) (discussing tendency of 
criminology to downplay research not supportive of favored theories on the causes 
of crime, while promoting weak evidence supporting traditional theories). 
 224. See James O. Finckenauer, Scared Straight and the Panacea Phenomenon 
(1982). 
 225. See Model Penal Code § 1.02(2)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating 
that a main goal was “to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods 
and knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of offenders”); § 410.9 (urging 
development of “Division of Research and Training” in departments of correction). 
 226. See, e.g., What Works in Preventing Crime? Systematic Reviews of 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Research, 578 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 8 (David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh eds, 2001); Francis T. 
Cullen, Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs, in Crime: Public Policies for 
Crime Control at 253-89 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002); 
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, 
What’s Promising (1998). 
 227. See Faye S. Taxman, Supervision—Exploring the Dimensions of 
Effectiveness, 66 Fed. Probation 14 (2002) (surveying literature on successful 
techniques and endorsing an “evidence-based model of supervision”). 
This content downloaded from 128.186.77.168 on Fri, 9 Jan 2015 14:31:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
LOGANMACRO 3/25/2004  3:08 PM 
2003] PROBATION AND PURPOSE 225 
critically important and complementary part in this 
evolution, forging a salutary bond between the bar and 
corrections researchers.  It will also function as a check on 
the tendency of rehabilitation to be conceived in unrealistic 
terms.  As Alan Harland has observed, “[c]larity of 
purposes/goals is an obvious precursor to any meaningful 
assessment, comparison, and evaluation of the strengths 
and weaknesses of different sanctions.”228  “Making decisions 
about correctional options in terms of kitchen sink or black 
box programs rather than in relation to the multiple and 
often conflicting intervention measures that they 
comprise . . . can lead to overprogramming and wasteful and 
possibly counterproductive application of correctional 
resources.”229  The data, in short, should serve to inform the 
permissible bounds of purpose-based decision making, with 
purpose, in turn, informing the decisions on the use of 
competing sentencing options in particular situations.230 
An illustration of a legislative framework that can 
serve as a starting point for the purpose-based approach 
advocated here can be found in North Carolina, which, 
along with a handful of other states, has expressly 
incorporated non-incarcerative sanctions into its 
sentencing guidelines.  North Carolina’s Structured 
Sentencing Act231 broadly divides penal sanctions into three 
 
 228. Harland, Handbook, supra note 176, at 37. 
 229. Alan T. Harland, Correctional Options That Work: Structuring the Inquiry 
in Choosing Correctional Options That Work: Defining the Demand and 
Evaluating the Supply 1, 5 (Alan T. Harland ed., 1996). 
 230. Professor Harland offers a “Rational Assessment Matrix” that, while 
intended as a thought exercise for broader programmatic correctional decisions, 
itself might aid efforts to rationalize the sentencing process.  The matrix entails 
several steps: 
1. Specify decision goals. 
2. Define decision options. 
3. Develop information to assess the relative merit of each option. 
4. Select, according to articulated decision rules, the option(s) thought to 
be most congruent with the stated goals. 
5. Reassess decisions on a periodic basis based on feedback from prior 
outcomes. 
Id. at 13 & 17 n.3. 
 231. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.10 et seq. (2002).  See generally Stevens H. 
Clarke, The Law of Sentencing, Probation and Parole in North Carolina 41-119 
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categories: (1) “active punishment”;232 (2) “community 
punishment”;233 and (3) “intermediate punishment.”234  A 
chart sets forth the applicability of the penal options, based 
on class of offense and the criminal history of offenders.235  
The chart prescribes that for the most serious offenders 
(those convicted of A-D felonies), only active imprisonment 
is authorized; for offenses of mid-level seriousness (those 
convicted of E-G felonies), either active imprisonment or an 
intermediate punishment can be imposed; and for least 
serious felonies (H-I felonies), all three options are 
available. 
Unfortunately, the Legislature failed to afford any 
guidance on the threshold question, when dispositional 
discretion exists, of whether imprisonment or a non-
incarcerative sanction might be warranted.236  Equally 
unfortunate, but again entirely consistent with experience, 
the Legislature failed to afford any guidance whatsoever on 
the purposes to be served in choosing between the two 
 
(2d ed. 1997); Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North 
Carolina, 1980-2000, 29 Crime & Just. 39 (Michael Tonry ed. 2000). 
 232. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.1(1) (2002) (defined as a “sentence in a 
criminal case that requires an offender to serve a sentence of imprisonment and is 
not suspended”). 
 233. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340-11(2) (2002) (defined as a “sentence in a 
criminal case that does not include an active punishment . . . [or] . . . an 
intermediate punishment . . .”). 
 234. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.11(6) (2002) (defined as a “sentence in a 
criminal case that places an offender on supervised probation and includes at 
least one of the following conditions”: special probation as defined in 15A-1351(a); 
assignment to a residential program; house arrest with electronic monitoring; 
intensive probation; and assignment to a day-reporting center). 
 235. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17 (2002). Departures are permitted, unless 
expressly prohibited, in the courts’ discretion.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1340.13(f)(g). 
 236. North Carolina law, as is common, only identifies a broad spectrum of 
avowed purposes to guide particular sentencing dispositions: 
The primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are to 
impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has 
caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the 
offender’s culpability; to protect the public by restraining offenders; to 
assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community 
as lawful citizens; and to provide a general deterrent to criminal behavior. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.12 (2002). 
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broad categories of non-“active punishment” (i.e., non-
incarcerative) sanctions, and the many types of sanctions 
contained within them.  Thus, while North Carolina 
succeeded in imposing some measure of rationality upon its 
sentencing enterprise, showing an appreciation of the basic 
types of sanctions populating the non-“active 
imprisonment” world, the State failed to afford courts any 
meaningful basis to implement the sanctions permitted, 
thus undercutting the enhanced rationality promised by 
purpose-based sentencing.237 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, much work 
remains to be done in the area of constructing purpose-based 
schemes for probation decision making.  Presuming the 
appropriateness of the approach, there remain at least two 
potential practical concerns relating to implementation.  The 
first relates to those situations in which purpose-driven 
decisions on particular conditions are potentially at odds 
with another, e.g., when a given offender’s background 
suggests a need for treatment yet public safety and 
retributive goals call for punitive outcomes.  Here, again, the 
legislature should be called upon to devise a hierarchy of 
purpose values, mindful of Henry Hart’s recognition that in 
transacting justice “the pursuit of one aim may be qualified 
by . . . the pursuit of others.”238  A possible legislative 
approach, in a system motivated by broad concern for desert 
and public safety, has been suggested by Michael Smith: 
1. The court shall impose the sentence it finds more likely 
to advance the penal purpose it specifies for the case 
than the alternatives brought to its attention; 
2. Public safety is the primary purpose to be specified, 
though just punishment should be an element of and a 
constraint upon every sentence; 
 
 237. Pennsylvania’s guidelines contain a helpful structure consisting of five 
offense levels with attendant purposes and available dispositional outcomes.  See 
supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.  However, the guidelines speak only 
in very broad and underinclusive terms with respect to purpose, do not make any 
effort to link particular sanctions with purposes, and provide for only modest 
appellate review. 
 238. Hart, supra note 129, at 3. 
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3. Public safety trumps desert when the court finds the 
magnitude of deserved punishment would interfere 
with the most plausible penal strategy for advancing 
public safety; but 
4. Desert is the only permissible purpose when a court 
finds no strategy plausible for advancing public safety 
through imposition of any penal measures authorized 
for the offense.239 
Such a legislative scheme, in turn, could be informed by the 
Institute’s preference in the proposed new Code for limiting 
retributivism and parsimony,240 affording courts a 
principled basis to select among possible conditions in 
instances when (i) purposes potentially conflict and/or (ii) 
the aggregate severity of combined conditions is thought 
excessive.241 
A second possible concern might stem from an 
argument that common law judges are not sufficiently 
expert in penal purposes to reach reliable outcomes.242  On 
 
 239. Smith, supra note 219, at 517 n.16.  Professor Smith elaborates on how 
such an approach might be operationalized: 
when imposing sentence, the court shall specify the primary purpose (just 
desert or public safety), specify facts relevant to its finding of desert, 
specify any penal strategy by which the public safety purpose is to be 
advanced, specify the penal measures by which it expects the sentence to 
serve the strategy, specify the facts upon which it finds the sentence more 
likely to advance its purposes than the alternatives known to it, and specify 
the facts justifying any exchange of desert for public safety. 
Id. at 497-98. 
 240. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Report 36-41 
(April 11, 2003).  The concepts of limiting retributivism and parsimony have their 
intellectual genesis in the work of Norval Morris.  For more on Professor Morris’s 
major influence on modern punishment theory and policy see Richard S. Frase, 
Limiting Retributivism: the Consensus Model of Criminal Punishment, in The 
Future of Imprisonment in the Twenty-First Century (Michael Tonry ed., 
forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 241. I am indebted to Professor Richard Frase for this suggestion.  In a 
forthcoming chapter, Professor Frase discusses the instructive approach used in 
the Oregon guidelines, which impose presumptive upper limits on the maximum 
array of probation conditions, based on “sanction units.”  See Frase, supra note 
240, at 40-41 (citing and discussing Oregon Sentencing Guideline Rules 213-005-
0001 et seq.). 
 242. For an argument to this effect see Leonard J. Long, Miller’s Algebra of 
Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 483, 494 (1992). 
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the contrary, judges, actors intimately involved in the daily 
work of dispensing justice, would appear optimally suited 
to assess and implement purposes.243  Their purpose-based 
judgments, complemented by available research on the 
effects of particular sanctions, and evaluated by appellate 
review, would lend enormous aid to the development of a 
critically important shared meaning of penal purposes.244 
The inevitable discretion entailed in such an approach 
is also potentially subject to the argument, most 
prominently voiced by Paul Robinson,245 that it risks 
disparity and unfairness because individual judges will 
weigh purposes, with all their potential indefiniteness. 
Such concern, however, as at the threshold decision 
discussed earlier, can be lessened by requiring that courts 
undertake “targeting”—“identifying offender groups by 
their profiles—those features that distinguish one group of 
offenders from another—in order to choose appropriate 
sanctions for them.”246  Moreover, by forcing courts to self-
critically specify purpose with respect to each condition 
imposed, the approach lessens the prospect for abuse.  
 
 243. As the Commentary to the revised ABA Standards observes, “sentencing 
courts are the best-positioned governmental actors to make such case-specific 
judgments.  By institutional training, judges have long experience in rendering 
particularized outcomes within a legal framework . . . .”  ABA Standards std. 18-
2.6 cmt. at 35.  See also Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of 
Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 Stan. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 93, 96 (1999) (urging greater judicial involvement in guidelines-
based system, justified by judiciary’s unique expertise wrought by case-by-case 
application of policy and practice); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems 
and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1441, 1455 (1997) (same). 
 244. What Henry Hart said of the judicial process applies more generally to the 
process envisioned here: “it permits principles to be worked pure and the details 
of implementing rules and standards to be developed in the light of intensive 
examination of the interaction of the general with the particular.”  Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 429-30 
(1958).  See also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 436 (2001) (opining that “general criteria . . . will acquire more meaningful 
content through case-by-case application at the appellate level”). 
 245. Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals for the Distribution of Penal 
Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 19, 20-21 (1987). 
 246. Kay A. Knapp & Madeline M. Carter, An Analytical Approach to 
Targeting, in Handbook, supra note 176, at 101, 110. 
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Appellate review and empirical evaluation, in turn, will 
exercise additional control.247 
In the end, the purpose-based approach advocated here 
has several major benefits.  First, and perhaps foremost, it 
ensures a more principled approach to sentencing, with 
attendant benefits of governmental transparency and 
accountability.  In more practical terms, the tying of purpose 
to sanctions, and vice versa, will ultimately assist in 
avoiding application of particular sanctions to inappropriate 
criminal offenders, which in the past has undermined the 
credibility of non-incarcerative sanctions.  This benefit 
extends to all sorts of conditions, including those of a 
“standard” nature enumerated in statutes (e.g., refrain from 
alcohol or drugs); programmatic innovations (e.g., boot 
camps and electronic monitoring); and even novel probation 
conditions imposed by courts pursuant to their traditionally 
broad statutory authority (e.g., limits on the freedom to 
associate and shame sanctions).  Ultimately, by forcing 
courts to think critically about options, a purpose-based 
approach promises more thoughtful application of non-
incarcerative alternatives,248 which today proportionately 
 
 247. Importantly, reviewing courts must take seriously their supervisory role, 
contrary to common practice.  See Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity 
Congress”: A Call for Meaning Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1199, 1233 (1999) (noting that “[o]n the rare 
occasion that criminal defendants challenge particular guidelines as inconsistent 
with the SRA, courts generally give such challenges short shrift”). 
 248. This power to innovate is indispensable to probation decision making, 
permitting courts to fit conditions to individual offenders.  As important, it 
permits the justice system to remain receptive to dynamic innovations in the field 
of probation.  See Livingston Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal: II, 
37 Colum. L. Rev. 762, 767 (1937) (expressing concern over unduly rigid 
codification “lest further development be hindered by precedents embodying in 
the law the incomplete knowledge of the present”).  For an argument that 
conditions should be limited to those specifically authorized by the legislature, 
based on evaluation and study, see Horwitz, supra note 124, at 158-60.  According 
to Professor Horwitz, such an approach “reduces the possibility that individual 
trial judges will respond inappropriately to public pressures and places 
constraints on the ability of trial judges to act upon their personal biases and 
prejudices, personal morality, or pop-psychological issues.”  Id. at 160.  For an 
example of an appellate court invalidating a probation condition (home detention) 
because it was not expressly authorized by statute see Bailey v. State, 734 A.2d 
684 (Md. 1999). 
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account for the majority of correctional outcomes, and will 
doubtless continue to predominate given fiscal pressures.249  
Such judicial clarity, in turn, will hopefully carry the 
ancillary benefit of promoting among probation field 
personnel an increased clarity of purpose that is currently 
lacking, a deficit considered the “greatest threat” to the 
effective operational capacity of probation.250 
CONCLUSION 
In 1988, Michael Tonry rightly observed that, while 
the Code’s “sentencing provisions represented a major 
advance over pre-Code practice,” its “sentencing provisions 
address the problems and institutions of the 1940s and 
1950s and much has changed since then.”251  This is surely 
no less true today, especially with respect to probation, an 
area of corrections that has changed dramatically over the 
past forty years.252  Nevertheless, many of the basic 
probation-related questions that concerned the drafters of 
the Code in 1962 abide to this day,253 as does an all-
 
 249. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 250. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Rethinking 
Probation: Community Supervision, Community Safety 2 (1998). 
 251. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and the Model Penal Code, 19 
Rutgers L.J. 823, 823 (1988). 
 252. One of the many tasks in the revamped Code sentencing provisions will 
involve an expanded menu of non-incarcerative sanctions, compared to the very 
limited list set forth in 1962.  See Model Penal Code § 6.02(3) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962).  The Commentary’s assertion that subsection (3) provides a 
“complete catalogue” of sentencing alternatives is plainly no longer accurate.  
Model Penal Code § 6.02 cmt. at 87 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).  
Clearly, the expansion should include conditions such as community service and 
the range of intermediate sanctions that have come into use over time.  Such a 
list should not, however, be exclusive.  Rather, it should serve as a guide to courts 
in their conditions-related decisions, permitting application of new and perhaps 
novel strategies coming into use, consistent with the evolutionary development of 
probation and its local character.  See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and 
Accountability Within Sentencing Structures, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 679, 702 (1993) 
(identifying two values in formulation of guidelines: “First, they must provide for 
local variability in types and levels of available programs. Second, they must 
legitimate a variety of sentencing purposes, although these purposes can be 
prioritized in different ways for different offenses.”). 
 253. Writing in 1952, at the dawn of the Institute’s work on the Code, Herbert 
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important matter they addressed only in the vaguest way: 
the animating purpose(s) of grants of probation and the 
conditions attending its imposition. 
The discussion here has tried to highlight the 
significance of this deficit and to advance the effort toward 
purposeful probation decision making.  If taken to heart, 
the approach holds promise for doing more than 
encouraging the reflective and hopefully optimal use of 
probation.  By thinking deeply about, developing, applying, 
and testing purposes in the complex arena of non-
incarcerative sanctions, the field of corrections as a whole 
can benefit, allowing a more principled (and perhaps 
parsimonious) use of criminal sanctions over time. 
 
Wechsler referred to probation as “perhaps . . . the most important modern 
contribution to the treatment field,” and catalogued a series of unresolved 
questions, including: “What criteria should govern a determination to employ 
probation . . . ?  What conditions ought to be permissible in a probation order . . . ?  
Should a defendant have a right to review of an invidious condition?”  Herbert 
Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1124-25 
(1952). 
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